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ARTICLE
THE CAT THAT CATCHES MICE: CHINA'S
CHALLENGE TO THE DOMINANT
PRIVATIZATION MODEL
Lan Cao*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most extraordinary dramas of our century has
produced one of the most compelling paradoxes of our time.
Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union has ended, and the Berlin Wall has collapsed. Market-
oriented economic reforms and political democratization have
been introduced to the region, conforming with popular notions
of the paradigm for reform.1 Yet, the transformation from to-
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lege; J.D. Yale Law School. I would like to thank Samuel Murumba, Arthur Pinto
and Anthony Sebok for their comments on an earlier version of this Article. I
would also like to thank James Grandolfo and Joshua Peirez for their research
assistance. This Article was supported by a summer research stipend from Brook-
lyn Law School.
1. The idealized paradigm consists of simultaneous political and economic lib-
eralization, or at least one followed in rapid succession by the other. In the case
of transitional economies, the virtues of immediate and rapid privatization of
planned economies have received widespread approval from Western institutions
and economists. See, e.g., John R. Guardiano, Exploding the Myths About Economic
Reform in Russia, Heritage Foundation Rep. (Heritage Foundation) No. 930, (Mar.
9, 1993), available in LEXIS, EXEC Library, HFRPTS File ("The solution to
Russia's economic problem is not less reform, but more reform. The government
should press ahead quickly with a comprehensive and full-fledged economic reform
program that would include continued mass privatization of state industry ....
Economic reform, moreover, should be carried out in a wholesale and not piece-
meal manner."); Jeffrey Sachs, Accelerating Privatization in Eastern Europe: The
Case of Poland, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIES 1991 (1991).
Political transformation to democracy is also deemed indispensable to eco-
nomic transformation. See, e.g., U.S. Policy Toward the Former Soviet Union: Hear-
ings of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) ("Our
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talitarianism to political democracy has also wreaked economic
chaos and disillusionment, and in the Soviet Union, disintegra-
tion from central authority into centrifugal conglomerates
euphemistically called the "Commonwealth of Independent
States."
On the other side of the globe, the antithesis to Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union can be found in China.
There, Tiananmen Square and political repression coexist with
an economy currently experiencing one of the most rapid
growth rates in the world. Nominally socialist but steadfastly
market-oriented, China is embarking on a strategy of slow but
steady economic transformation.
"Privatization" is a term used to describe the means by
which a centrally planned economy can effectively make the
transition to a market economy.2 While there are critical dif-
approach in assembling last year's foreign assistance program was to reinforce
those trends in Russian political and economic life that together, we believe, con-
stitute the essence of the great transformation underway in that country. Those
trends are democratization and privatization.") (testimony of Strobe Talbott, Deputy
Secretary of State) (hereinafter Talbott Testimony).
Eastern Europe fits the Western paradigm for reform because it emphasizes
both political democracy and immediate privatization of the state sector.
2. For a more in-depth discussion of the evolving meanings associated with
the term "privatization," see discussion infra part II.A.
While the privatization debate, at least in the context of emerging market
economies, usually centers around the transformation of an economy from central-
ized to more decentralized arrangements, its subtext is also about political liberal-
ization. For the view that political and economic liberalization go hand in hand,
see Michael Hirsh, The State Strikes Back, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1993, at
123, 127 ("[U]ltimately the development debate is also about how best to achieve
democracy."); Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism, Prosperity and Democracy, 2 CONST.
POL. ECON. 372, 372 (1991) ("A constitution designed to promote economic develop-
ment and democratic reform could provide an important stimulus in both direc-
tions.").
For the view that economics and politics are more often sequentially or
causally rather than simultaneously linked, see MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN, WHAT
WENT WRONG WITH PERESTROIKA (1991). "The simultaneous introduction of the
economic reforms associated with perestroika and the political reforms referred to
as glasnost all but guaranteed that chaos would follow .... [Als early as 1987, it
was apparent that combining perestroika and glasnost was like mixing sulfuric
acid and water-it would set off sparks." Id. at 124-25; Samuel Huntington, Chal-
lenges Facing Democracy: What Cost Freedom, CURRENT 22, 25 (1993) ("[Elconomic
development promotes democratization .... Transitions to democracy are heavily
concentrated among countries at the upper-middle income level of development.").
It has also been argued that one should be given priority over the other. "One of
the bitterest lessons of the 'transition' is: You can have bread without freedom,
but you cannot enjoy freedom forever without bread." Shlomo Maital & Ben-Zion
Milner, Russia and Poland: The Anatomy of Transition, CHALLENGE, Sept. 1993, at
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ferences between privatization processes employed by China
and Eastern Europe, both regions have produced a set of com-
mon transitional dilemmas. Hidden traps beneath the path of
reform have become an increasingly volatile and disruptive
force. The initial euphoria associated with change has given
way to a host of sobering concerns: how to dismantle an obso-
lete system of bureaucratic central planning,3 construct a new
economic order grounded on institutions of a fledgling market
economy, and at the same time, create economic growth and
increased productivity with some semblance of order, or at
least with minimum disorder.
There are generally two exits for countries previously
organized under the principles of full public ownership of the
means of production and compulsory state economic planning.'
First, the dramatic "Big Bang" exit, characterized by radical
"shock therapy" prescriptions adopted by many of the Eastern
European countries, involves immediate privatization of the
state sector, including the swift transfer of assets from public
to private hands. Second, the more gradual, less explosive form
42.
3. For a compelling presentation of the view that it is not socialism per se
that has been rejected but rather Soviet-style socialism, see John Elliott, Challeng-
es Facing Social Economics in the Twenty-First Century: A Radical Democratic
Perspective, 51 REV. SOC. ECON. 504 (1993); Paul M. Sweezy, Socialism: Legacy
and Renewal, MONTHLY REV., Jan. 1993, at 1-9.
4. The race to depart from Marxist economic orthodoxy to embark on a mar-
ket-oriented path of reform has begun for almost all countries organized under the
principles of central planning. See, e.g., Barbara Bradley, Burma Capitalism is
Half-Baked but on the Rise, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Jan. 25, 1995, at 8 (The
government has abandoned "'the Burmese Road to Socialism!" in favor of a free
market by privatizing farming and other industries); Cuba, COUNTRY REP. (Walden
Pub.), (Jan. 30, 1995), available in LEXIS, World Library, COUREP File (By the
end of 1994, various concessions to a mixed market were made allowing farmers
to sell above-quota surplus at market prices and local state industries to sell man-
ufactured products to the public at market rates); Ija Halasz, Mongolia to Open
Stock Trading to Foreigners, Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Feb. 5, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, NONUS File (Mongolian privatization of its state companies
have resulted in about half of its 2.2 million people becoming shareholders of
former state enterprises); Daniel Southerland, Mongolia Takes a Hard Road,
WASH. POST, June 13, 1992, at G1; Vietnam Halves Number of State-Owned Firms,
Reuters World Service, Feb. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, NONUS
File (Communist Vietnam has reduced the number of its state-owned firms to
approximately 6000, half the 1990 figure. The government has dissolved 2000
money-losing state enterprises, restructured others into shareholding companies to
improve their performance and currently has plans to open a pilot stock exchange
to trade in government bonds).
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of disengagement pursued by China, involves the initial cre-
ation of a nonstate sector followed by limited privatization of
the state sector. This path has been called "socialism with
Chinese characteristics,"5 and more specifically, "privatization
with Chinese characteristics."6 This method of privatization is
characterized by a strategy which eschews the current Eastern
European wholesale transfer of state enterprises from the state
to the private sector.
Although there are two generally recognized ex-
its-gradual extrication from the central plan or a quick leap
to private ownership-it has been assumed that all exits lead
to the same common destination: a Western style economy
based on full private property rights. This Article explores the
more uncommon and seemingly less dramatic approach favored
by China, an approach gradual in speed and different in orien-
tation from the Eastern European approach. The Chinese mod-
el is based on carefully orchestrated sequences7 designed to
create a two-track economic system consisting of parallel state
and nonstate sectors. Thus, the Chinese model makes an in-
herent distinction between privatizing the state sector and
creating a nonstate sector. Additionally, within this separate
5. Deng Xiaoping first coined this term in a statement about China's at-
tempts to deal with its exploding population growth. "[Tihe problem of China is its
excessive population . . . . [O]nly a socialist system can solve this problem ....
The socialism we are talking about is one with Chinese characteristics." China
Can Only Go the Socialist Road, PEOPLE'S DAILY (overseas ed.) June 24, 1989, at
1.
6. Matthew Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Companies in
China, 3 COLUMi. BUS. L. REV. 301, 302 (1993).
7. This description does not suggest that the central authorities in Beijing
have always been successful in prescribing reform from above. As a popular Chi-
nese saying goes, "Those above propose a policy; those below implement their
own." Gerrit Gong, China's Fourth Revolution, 17 WASH. Q. 26, 32 (1994). China's
reformers themselves describe the process as one of trial and error, similar to
"groping for stones to cross the river." Carl Riskin, Where is China Going?, in THE
CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS FUTURE 41, 52 (Peter Nolan & Dong Fureng eds.,
1990).
Indeed, Beijing has often been surprised by renegade initiatives undertaken
by commercially minded provinces without the capital's prior blessings. For exam-
ple, officials of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, located across the border
from Hong Kong in one of China's most prosperous regions, Guangdong Province,
unilaterally decided on December 18, 1990, to open its own stock exchange without
asking for Beijing's approval. Beijing's response to this open act of defiance was
not to shut down the exchange, but rather to allow it to exist if Shenzhen in turn
agreed to a postponement of a few months. See Orville Schell & Todd Lappin,
China Plays the Market, 1992 THE NATION 727.
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nonstate sector, the Chinese model has also spawned unortho-
dox economic organizations founded on hybrid, nontraditional
concepts of ownership. As this Article will argue, the success of
these unorthodox entities not only challenges conventional pre-
scriptions for economic reform but also calls into question the
traditional dichotomy between centrally planned and market
economies.
Beyond the inherent distinctions it draws between the
state and nonstate sectors, the Chinese model is particularly
interesting for two primary reasons. First, its very success
poses a serious challenge to the conventional view that the
only effective reform package is the one offered by the "shock
therapy" school.' Although proponents of "shock therapy" re-
form argue that only the faint-hearted will reject this route,
because anything less will result in distorted economic develop-
ment, the "anti-shock" model has been adopted quite success-
fully by China.
The Chinese model is also interesting for a second and
perhaps more significant reason. Its success challenges many
of the implicit and fundamental assumptions that have re-
mained buried in the privatization debate. It has been as-
sumed, for example, that the objective of transitional econo-
mies is to privatize in order to arrive at the same inevitable
destination, namely a full and unfettered market economy
founded on clear, transparent and unambiguous private prop-
erty rights. With so unquestioned a goal, the only thing left to
be worked out is the speed with which this goal can be accom-
plished. Thus, even though there may be hares and tortoises
on this transitional path, it is supposed that both will aim
towards and arrive at a common end point modeled on the
advanced industrial economies.
With this goal in mind, it is no wonder that the debate has
8. As the term itself suggests, "shock therapy" conveys an image for how to
cure a body politic of what ails it economically. It suggests attaching electrodes to
the body and putting quite a bit of voltage through that body. It suggests, in
other words, pain. Talbott Testimony, supra note 1, at 19. Some of the characteris-
tics of shock therapy include introducing free prices, eradicating subsidies, allowing
inefficient state enterprises to go bankrupt, saving the salvageable by mass privat-
ization, and laying off excess workers. Shock therapists typically promise that the
pain will only be temporary, and its short-term effects (unemployment, higher pric-
es, social dislocation, and economic instability) will be more than offset by the
long-term benefits of a swift and unequivocal transition.
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been narrowly framed in terms of revolution versus evolution.
In fact, the term "transitional economy" itself takes for granted
not just the fact that the economy in question is making a
"transition," but also the fact that it is making a transition to a
self-fulfilling prophecy, an all-too-certain logic embodied in the
"acceptable" economies of the United States, the European
Union, and Japan.
This Article will examine the Chinese model and explore
why, despite its shortcomings, it still presents a feasible and
plausible alternative to the more dominant model that inspired
reforms in Eastern Europe. China's unique transitional path as
well as its unique institutional arrangements present a wholly
different alternative. This Article will argue that while eco-
nomic growth has certainly been fueled by the creation of a
market-oriented, nonstate economy, such nonstate growth has
also been generated by unorthodox market entities, such as
collectives, with vague private property rights. Moreover, the
retention of the state sector and the concomitant creation of a
nonstate sector consisting of multiple property arrangements
presents an additional challenge to the conventional prescrip-
tion that state sector privatization is always required. Accord-
ing to conventional prescription, because clear property rights
are a prerequisite to producing efficient markets and generat-
ing economic growth, and because privatization is the best
means with which this end can be achieved, state sector pri-
vatization is an absolute imperative for ailing transitional
economies.
Yet China departs from the dominant prescription for
three reasons. First, it rejects immediate privatization of the
state sector and encourages the initial creation of a new,
nonstate sector. Second, it is making a transition to an econo-
my with different concepts of property rights and ownership.
Third, the strategy it has adopted to arrive at that point is not
complete state sector privatization but rather a gradual model
consisting of three phases of reform, only the last of which
involves some privatization of the state sector. Even then, the
Chinese approach is limited state sector privatization which is
diametrically opposed to the Eastern European model of mass
privatization. In this context, Chinese privatization has
evolved over time into three manageable sequences: the cre-
ation of a new, nonstate sector, the reformation of the existing
state sector, and the privatization of the state sector.
102 [Vol. MX:I1
THE CHINESE MODEL
-Part II of this Article describes the general framework of
the privatization debate, and compares the dominant Eastern
European model with the more novel Chinese model. It also
examines the ideological and economic contexts in which both
models were undertaken, focusing on the Chinese model and
its theoretical underpinnings. Particular emphasis is placed on
the economic benefits generated by the Chinese model and the
economic rationale for deferring state sector privatization.
Part III examines the first sequence of reform. Instituted
since 1978, this sequence involves the creation of a nonstate
sector coexisting on a parallel track with the state sector and
consisting of multiple property arrangements: private enter-
prises, collective enterprises called township-village enterprises
(TVEs),9 and foreign invested enterprises. Because the most
significant and economically productive enterprises within this
nonstate sector universe are the TVEs, Part III focuses on
these unorthodox entities and the implications to be drawn
from their economic success. As decentralized state enterprises
under the ownership and control of the local provincial or vil-
lage governments, their success is directly contrary to conven-
tional dogma on privatization. Part III will conclude that the
success of TVEs demonstrates that clear private property ar-
rangements are not always required to generate economic
growth and that markets can function without private owner-
ship as that term is traditionally understood.
Part IV explores and assesses state sector reform in China.
It first examines state sector reform in the absence of state
sector privatization. These were reforms undertaken to im-
prove public sector efficiency and productivity in state enter-
prises without altering the foundation of the state's ownership
rights. In this regard, this Article will examine the measures
China took to induce its state enterprises to reorient their
behavior, to favor innovation over routine and marketization
over central planning. Part IV also examines the creation of a
dual pricing system for state enterprises and the transfer and
assignment of property use rights under a wide variety of con-
tracts. These property rights were transferred progressively
from the state to the enterprise in order to allow the latter
9. While "collective enterprises" are not private enterprises, they are not con-
sidered state enterprises either. See infra text accompanying notes 109-13.
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greater autonomy over management, marketing, and other
decisions relating to the business. At the same time, manageri-
al reforms, including profit retention schemes and bonus plans
adopted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, have also led to
greater public sector efficiency and productivity.
The second section of Part IV analyzes the current stage of
Chinese state sector privatization, which is the gradual trans-
formation in ownership of state enterprises into a shareholding
system by private equity participation. It is only in this last
phase of reform that China has finally pursued privatization as
it has been traditionally employed by transferring state owner-
ship rights to private interests. Part IV will also demonstrate
that state sector privatization in China is wholly different from
state sector privatization as adopted by Eastern Europe for the
following reasons. First, state sector privatization in China is
implemented only after a full-fledged nonstate sector has been
created, so that transfer of ownership from state to private
hands occurs in the context of an already highly-marketized
framework. And second, state sector privatization in China is
intended to be circumscribed, not widespread, in the number of
enterprises to be privatized, the percentage of shares that can
be privately owned, and the trading of those shares on the
stock exchanges.
Part IV will use as an example the recent securities issues
of Chinese enterprises and examine how the development of a
securities market in China is a reflection of the carefully cali-
brated choices of the Chinese government to engage in rather
limited privatization of the state sector. In this regard, Part IV
argues that state sector privatization has been uneven and
that the government's preoccupation with remaining majority
shareholder has created a securities market insufficiently re-
sponsive to the needs of other shareholders. The prescription
for this ill, however, lies not in more or faster privatization,
but in better privatization. Thus, if state sector privatization is
to be instituted, it should include among its goals more than
just the objectives of capital fundraising and state control of
the securities market.
Although it is a paradigm that currently dominates the
privatization discourse, full, immediate and clear-cut privatiza-
tion is not desirable for all economies. The relative success of
China's two-track model of privatization should invite serious
consideration of alternative forms of privatization, as well as
104 [Vol. XXI: I
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economic diversity in so-called transitional economies. In addi-
tion, as the success of the TVEs show, if a market can be con-
structed and market oriented behavior induced, then uninhibit-
ed privatization of existing state institutions, given the social
costs, may not be the prescription required or desired.
II. FRIEND AND FOE; CONTRASTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
STATE SECTOR IN CHINESE AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
PRIVATIZATION ECONOMICS AND IDEOLOGY.
A. Introduction
Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the term "privatiza-
tion" has made a dramatic entrance into the emerging legal
orders. Privatization has been accorded almost mystical status,
as if its incantation will dissolve all difficulties inherent in
reform and transition."0 However, despite its popular usage,
the term "privatization" alone is so generalized as to be devoid
of meaning if not grounded in the context of where and when it
is employed." For example, within the context of just one re-
10. Not only must reformers "move on all fronts at once-or not move at all,"
Lal Jayawardena, Preface to OLIVIER BLANCHARD ET AL., REFORM IN EASTERN
EUROPE at vii, ix (1991), all fronts must additionally share one common goal-to
reassign state ownership to private hands as quickly as possible. "The need to
accelerate privatization is the paramount economic policy issue facing Eastern
Europe. If there is no breakthrough in the privatization of large enterprises in the
near future, the entire process could be stalled for years to come." Sachs, supra
note 1, at 15; see also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ET AL., THE ECONOMY OF
THE USSR: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 (1990) ("the ultimate goal of
ownership reform is to privatize almost all enterprises"); WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1991: THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 144 (1991) ("Privatization is nec-
essary and highly desirable, even though difficult and time-consuming."). CATHER-
INE MANN ET AL., POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE PRI-
VATIZATION SCHEMES 8 (Conference on Markets, States, and Democracy: The Politi-
cal Economy of Post-Communist Transformation, sponsored by the Center for Ger-
man and European Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and the
Friedrich Ebert Stifftung (Feb. 11-13, 1993) Working Paper No. 5.14, 1993) ("Speed
is important, since proceeding slowly risks allowing political opposition to develop
that could weaken and perhaps unravel progress achieved to date.").
11. On the other hand, at the other end of the spectrum of too general is too
specific. Too much specificity can also cause one to throw up one's hands and
conclude, simply, that "the French experience of privatization is unsuitable for
Russia and Mexican lessons are useless for Eastern European, Cuban, Chinese and
Vietnamese enterprises." Andrei Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of State
Property in Post-Socialist Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 PAC. BASIN
L.J. 131, 139 (1993). Thus, "we cannot push into the Procrustean bed all the dif-
ferent historical, legal, and economic forms of privatization." Id. Indeed, this ap-
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gion or country, the definition of privatization is evolving con-
tinuously.
[Alt its broadest level, the term 'privatization' refers merely
to the introduction of some private enterprise into the econo-
my. For example, enacting a law which allows an artisan to
become self employed is a form of privatization .... This
meaning of privatization was relevant to developments in
Eastern Europe less than three to five years ago. Now, how-
ever, for the most part Eastern European economies have
moved far beyond these initial stages.12
Indeed, at the current stage of the transformation process,
"in the context of Eastern Europe, privatization means the
transfer of state owned enterprises to private ownership ....
For example, in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, the
term privatization is generally used to refer to a specific pro-
gram for the wholesale divestment of state enterprises." 13
Moreover, privatization in emerging economies will be
different from privatization in developed, market economies.
For example, privatization in the more highly developed mar-
ket economies of Western Europe only entailed a sale of state
assets to a more efficient private sector. It did not necessitate
the restructuring or reconstruction of the economy. 4 By con-
proach, if stretched to its limits, can result in the conclusion that unless initial
conditions and structures were identical, the experience of one country is analyti-
cally meaningless if applied to another country. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sachs & Wing
Thye Woo, Understanding the Reform Experiences of China, Eastern Europe and
Russia, in FROM REFORM TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRANSI-
TION IN ASIA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 23 (Chung H. Lee & Helmut
Reisen eds., 1994).
12. Richard M. Phillips & Marian G. Dent, Privatizing Eastern Europe: A
Challenge for the Nineties, in JOINT VENTURES AND PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN
EUROPE, at 445, 448 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 575, 1991).
13. There are, of course, differences within Eastern Europe itself. "In other
states, which have not progressed as far towards a Western style economy (for
example Romania and Albania), privatization may merely refer to the efforts of
individual SOEs [state-owned enterprises] to introduce an element of private own-
ership or to create a joint venture with private firms." Id. at 448-49.
14. ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN
EUROPE: IS THE STATE WITHERING AWAY 21 (1994). Sales of British Airways, Brit-
ish Steel, British Telecom took place in a "fundamentally market environment
dominated by private property." Id. Moreover, "prior to their privatization, state
enterprises in . . . Great Britain had to operate in competition with other private
companies and their managerial system (even if often less efficient than that of
their private analogues) was basically a product of the surrounding capitalist busi-
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trast,
privatization, in the environment of the transitional econo-
mies, is not a simple transfer of ownership from the state to
private individuals. It is rather a process by which the very
institution of property, in the sense in which lawyers and
economists employ the term, is reintroduced into East Euro-
pean societies.15
Thus, for all transitional economies, questions have arisen
concerning not just the optimal pace of reform or the sequence
of reform but also the type of property that reform is supposed
to create. Should privatization of state enterprises be imple-
mented first? Or should a framework designed to induce mar-
ket-oriented behavior be adopted before state enterprises are
transferred to private hands?
In these two very basic aspects alone, the Eastern Europe-
an and Chinese models of privatization represent two unmis-
takably disparate strategies of reform. The Eastern European
model favors quick privatization of state enterprises and in-
vests significant capital and resources into the conceptualiza-
tion and implementation of this process. The premise of the
Eastern European model is that clear-cut private property
rights are not just an inherent good but also a necessary pre-
condition for economic growth and efficiency. Because privat-
ization clarifies muddled property arrangements and transfers
ownership rights from the state to private hands, privatization
is considered necessary for the institution of a dynamic market
economy.
By contrast, the Chinese model favors retention of state
enterprises and encourages the creation of a new set of firms
in a distinct nonstate sector. A basic premise underlying the
Chinese model is that the fundamentals of a market-oriented
economy must be established before state sector privatization
can be successfully pursued, if it is to be pursued at all. Thus,
China's goal for many years has been the creation of a
nonstate sector oriented towards the maximization of profits
and the efficiency of production.
Different ideological as well as economic considerations
ness culture." Id.
15. Id. at 10.
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underlie the decision to adopt one model over the other. A
political motive was fundamental to the decision by Eastern
European countries to pursue a model founded on speedy and
mass privatization of state owned enterprises. In a similar
vein, an equally fundamental political impulse caused China to
adopt a model that insulates the state sector from change and
preserves, to the extent practical, vestiges of social ownership.
This next section will focus on the ideological and econom-
ic means by which China has sought to privatize its economy,
and as a point of contrast, compare the Chinese experience
with the Eastern European model.
B. Ideological Considerations: China and Eastern Europe
To underscore China's shift from ideological purity to prag-
matism, Deng Xioaping once noted that yellow cat or white cat,
it's a good cat if it catches mice.16 This paradigmatic shift al-
lowed China to adopt a series of reforms intended to reduce
the role of central planning and extend the role of markets.
While pragmatism has allowed China to create and use the
market in a way that could not have been contemplated before
1978, ideology has also ensured that such reforms will be kept
within doctrinally acceptable parameters and will not displace
the centrality of the state sector. Thus, a nonstate sector sepa-
rate from public ownership of the means of production was
created and the state sector itself was retained.
Public ownership of the means of production is still a cen-
16. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 730. Addressing the seventh Plenum of
the third Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League on July 7,
1962, Deng Xiaoping said:
As to what kind of relations of production is the best mode, I'm afraid
we shall have to leave the matter to the discretion of local authorities,
allowing them to adopt whatever mode of production that can facilitate
quickest recovery and growth of agricultural production. The masses
should also be allowed to adopt whatever mode they see fit, legalizing
illegal practices as necessary. These are all tentative ideas, not final
decisions, so they will not necessarily come to pass in the future. When
talking about fighting battles, Comrade Liu Bocheng often uses this
Sichuan popular saying: "It does not matter if it is a yellow cat or a
black cat, as long as it catches mice."
DENG XIAOPING, How to Recover the Agricultural Production, in, SELECTED WORKS
OF DENG XIAOPING (1938-1965) 292, 293 (1992).
This speech was used by Party conservatives to charge Deng Xiaoping with
"going capitalist" and Deng was subsequently purged during the Cultural Revo-
lution.
108 [Vol. MX: I
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tral tenet of Marxist theory. After the Communist revolution in
1949, mass rural collectivizations and the restructuring of all
businesses into state enterprises owned by all of the people
were carried out under the banner of Marxist ideology. 7 It
was not until 1978 when Deng Xiaoping initiated an open door
policy that China took the first of many incremental steps
toward what has been called a "fourth revolution."18 This rev-
olution is characterized by a process of limited and controlled
privatization with an "increasing market orientation... in
ownership, production, investment, and demand[.]" 9
This fourth revolution is not characterized by any singular
defining moment or violent shift along ideological fault lines on
the scale of the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Rather, it is marked by subtle but persistent threads of
reform which are revolutionary in implication but evolutionary
in approach, designed to avoid disillusionment with change or
pendulum politics and backlash." Thus, China's quest to em-
17. See Howard Chao & Yang Xiaoping, Private Enterprise in China: the De-
veloping Law of Collective Enterprises, 19 INTL LAW. 1215, 1217 (1985) for a de-
scription of the process effected by the Chinese Communist Party between 1949
and 1956, in which "nationalist capitalist enterprises" underwent "social transfor-
mation."
See also ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution] IXIANFA
(1982)]. Article 6 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he basis of the socialist
economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of
the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective
ownership by the working people." Id. art. 6. Article 7 further states that "[tihe
state economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole
people; it is the leading force in the national economy." Id. art. 7.
18. Gong, supra note 7, at 34.
19. Id. at 30.
20. By contrast, backlash in Eastern Europe has been occurring in recent
months:
In Russia, shock therapy had a backlash in December's parliamen-
tary elections, giving an antireformist, ultranationalist party a quarter of
the vote. In Poland ... the former Communists-standing for a slower
reform platform in elections-became the largest party in Parliament.
Similar results are expected in Hungary's spring elections, and in Roma-
nia and Bulgaria, the former Communists are gaining.
Everywhere, the slow track to reform has an increasing appeal as
more jobs disappear, prices rise, and living standards go on falling.
Eric Bourne, East Europeans Feel Duped by the West's Promises of Aid, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 26, 1994, at 3.
Because "poorly planned privatizations have done more harm than good,"
Eastern European governments have begun to question whether privatization is "a
reform they can afford to skip." Tired of Capitalism? So Soon?, ECONOMIST, Jan.
21, 1995, at 61.
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bark on its fourth revolution and to construct the workings of a
"socialist market economy" have been guided by the defining
criteria of "balancing growth with stability, order with dyna-
mism, change with constancy."
21
"Socialism with Chinese characteristics" or "market social-
ism" thus accommodates both of China's stated objectives: to
achieve economic growth through market reforms, and to bal-
ance growth with stability in order to generate change without
rupture. Hence, there emerges the ideologically pragmatic
mantra of "market socialism," controlling the hurly-burly of
market within the familiar parameters of socialism. Not sur-
prisingly, ideological pragmatism has become the guiding prin-
ciple for China's reformers,22 who emphasize economic growth,
increased efficiency, production before distribution,23 and mar-
21. Gong, supra note 7, at 35.
China pledged to continue market-oriented reforms at the Communist Party
Third Central Committee Plenum, but rejected shock therapy in favor of the "Chi-
na model," based more along the line of the "four little dragons," Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, than on American or European economic
models. Daniel Kwan, Third Plenum's Agenda Revealed, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 5, 1993, at 8, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, SCHINA File.
22. Under Deng Xiaoping, "practice [is] the sole criterion of truth." Gong,
supra note 7, at 35.
Deng Xiaoping's ideological pragmatism has percolated throughout Chinese
society as well. A Chinese agriculture specialist recently asserted that Karl Marx
had "'fully affirmed [the] viewpoint" held by Adam Smith that supply and demand
should be regulated through the "invisible hand" of the market. H. Lyman Miller,
Holding the Deng Line, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 22. Nowhere is this
ideological pragmatism more freely exhibited than in China's embryonic but devel-
oping stock exchanges. According to Wei Wenyuan, chief executive of the Shanghai
Stock Exchange, "when we think about the development of our economy, we have
stopped thinking about whether it is socialism or capitalism." Michael Hirsh,
China's Financial Revolutionaries, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (int'l ed.), July 31,
1993, at 43, 51. As Huang Guixian, an executive at Shanghai Shenyin Securities,
said, "'We used to decide first if something new was socialist or capitalist ....
Now we see whether it works, then decide whether it is socialist or capitalist.'"
Id.
23. Under "market socialism," emphasis shifted from distribution of resources
to production of resources. As Winston Churchill so succinctly noted before the
House of Commons, "the inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of
blessings; the inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries." Maital
& Milner, supra note 2, at 46.
As early as 1978, the third plenary session of the 11th Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee declared: "To realize the four modernizations, it is neces-
sary to raise productive forces dramatically, and it is thus also necessary to
change from various aspects the productive relations and superstructure which are
incompatible with the growth of productive forces, and to change all unsuitable
management styles, operational styles and ideological styles.'" Dissent, Official
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ket incentives, all within the ideologically comforting confines
of central planning.24
To date, market socialism has produced a marked shift
towards the market in a country that, as recently as 1978,
depended on its public sector to produce 78% of its industrial
output." As discussed more fully in Part III, a nonstate sector
was created and by 1992 alone was responsible for 52% of
gross industrial output and more than 57% of nonagricultural
employment." In addition to creating a booming nonstate sec-
tor and a shrinking state sector,2 China has also managed to
Journal Closed for Publishing Pro-Democracy Articles, British Broadcasting Corpo-
ration Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, TBBCSW File.
24. In defending "market socialism," Deng Xiaoping stated, "A planned econo-
my does not equal socialism, because planning also exists in capitalism. A market
economy does not necessarily equal capitalism because the market also exists in
socialism. In order to make socialism superior to capitalism, we must boldly take
heed of and absorb all the accomplishments of civilization that the human race
has achieved,' including 'all the advanced modes of operation and management
developed by other countries.'" Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 729-30.
25. Gong, supra note 7, at 31. By contrast, in 1979, the small-scale Chinese
private sector provided only 23% of total industrial output. Guardiano, supra note
1.
26. Gong, supra note 7, at 31. If agricultural production and the service sector
are counted, the private sector could be said to account for 75% of total economic
output in China. Guardiano, supra note 1. By contrast, the state sector accounted
for only 35% of the output of goods and services, a figure slightly above the gov-
ernment share in many European countries. Sir Alec Cairncross & Cyril Z. Lin,
The Private Sector that Is Driving China, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at 13.
But it is not just the public sector that has shrunk. Beijing's financial dom-
inance over the provinces has as well. For example, while 80% of Guangdong's
budget came from Beijing in 1980, in 1992, only two percent did. Gong, supra
note 7, at 31.
Another sign that Beijing has been willing to relinquish some degree of
control over the economy can be seen in the ever diminishing share of the econo-
my that Beijing has been taking for its central coffers. As William Overholt, man-
aging director of Bankers Trust, Hong Kong, stated in his book, "[in a truly so-
cialist economy, such as China was at the beginning of reform, the government se-
questers a large fraction of gross national product (GNP) for its purposes. Near
the other end of the spectrum, the capitalist, anti-tax U.S. and Hong Kong govern-
ments take less than one fifth of GNP. At the time reform was decreed in 1978,
Beijing took almost 39%. By 1990, the central government's share of the economy
was similar to that of Hong Kong." WILLIAMvi OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA 48
(1993).
27. "[Tlhe state enterprise sector has declined during the reform period from
considerably more than half of the total economy to somewhat less than half."
OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 50. Macroeconomic reforms have occurred as well.
Prices of nearly all products, except for a few basic necessities, have been freed to
fluctuate according to supply and demand. One source estimates that only about
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achieve a level of economic growth previously unparalleled for
a country comprising one-fifth of the world's population.28 In
addition to pure economic growth, China has also managed to
achieve an unprecedented increase in foreign trade. This in-
crease has proceeded at a rate which signifies a shift from a
position of radical self-reliance and isolation to a position of in-
creased integration into the international economy.29
The numbers do not merely show that China experienced
economic growth and increased productivity. More importantly,
the figures show that economic growth and increased produc-
tivity occurred in the emerging nonstate sector." This strate-
12% of China's industrial output was subject to central planning in 1992. Paul
Blustein, Can 'Half-Reformed' China Last?, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1993, at A27.
28. China's growth rate after Deng Xiaoping's 1979 economic reform plan
climbed to an annual rate of 10%. OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 29. Although a
brief decline to four percent occurred in 1988 and 1989 as a result of measures
designed to arrest inflation, growth has accelerated to seven percent in 1991 and
to 12.8% in 1992. Id. at 29-30.
The seven percent growth rate, the rate that has characterized the "Asian
miracle economies," id. at 30, at least until China's experience, has appeared to be
a phenomenon largely confined to either relatively small countries, such as Hong
Kong (six million), Singapore (two million), Taiwan (20 million) or relatively homo-
geneous countries, such as South Korea and Japan. Id. at 27.
29. By 1992, China's foreign trade rose to $166 billion and its exports in-
creased from $14.8 billion in 1979 to $85 billion in 1992. Id. Exports of sophisti-
cated goods increased as well, so that while manufactured goods accounted for
only half of Chinas exports in 1985, they accounted for more than three quarters
of all exports in 1991. Id. at 30-31.
China's attempts to increase foreign investment through a well-calibrated
system of incentives succeeded in attracting more than $20 billion of investment in
its first dozen years of reform. Id. at 31. In 1992 alone, foreign investors invested
$11.2 billion and signed agreements for $57.5 billion in future investments. Id. At
the end of 1991, foreign-invested enterprises on Chinese soil generated $12.05
billion of exports constituting almost 17% of China's total exports. Id. Indeed, for-
eign enterprises in China, which already account for a major share of China's
GNP, are expanding by the phenomenal rate of 50% annually. Even in 1989, the
year of Tiananmen, the rate of foreign enterprise investment in China declined
only to 43%. Id. at 50.
For a description of foreign-invested enterprises in China, see Michael J.
Moser, Foreign Investment in China: The Legal Framework, in FOREIGN TRADE, IN-
VESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 106-42 (Michael
Moser ed., 1984)
30. The emergence of a private sector outside the traditional state sector has
also resulted in the marginalization of the once omnipotent Communist Party. As
the Wall Street Journal reported, "[tihe economic opportunities since the party
unfettered the economy in December 1978 have made money a rival to the party
for people's attention." Joseph Kahn & Marcus Brauchli, China's Communists Face
Serious Threat: Creeping Irrelevance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1994, at A9. While top
college graduates once competed to become party members, they now scorn party
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gy of privatization through the creation of a new nonstate sec-
tor, rather than the privatization of the existing state sector, is
one of the more remarkable hallmarks of privatization in Chi-
na.
31
While this vibrant nonstate sector was being constructed,
the state sector itself was steadfastly preserved. Unlike the
countries of Eastern Europe, which desired to abandon their
Communist past and return as swiftly as possible to the folds
of free market Europe, China had no such political mandate.
Paradoxically, the very institutional legacies that limit the
parameters of political change, may also have diverted China
from embarking on the route of radical marketization, possibly
saving the country from the kind of economic cacophony that
has plagued Russia. As a result, the double-edged sword that
set limits on the very possibility for total political reinvention
has also kept China from underestimating the necessity for
maintaining stability. The desire to avoid traumatic transfor-
mation remains a foundation of the Chinese model of privatiza-
tion.
Chinese privatization thus emerged gradually from and
was shaped by "market socialism" or "socialism with Chinese
characteristics." The state sector, which provides the underpin-
ning of the socialist system, could not be privatized without
either undermining the very ideological foundation of Chinese
socialism or risking substantial disruption in China's political,
social, and economic system." Privatization in Communist
membership. An entire new world has opened up in the flourishing private econo-
my and the old world offered by the party is dwindling into a sphere of irrele-
vance.
31. Instead of focusing
on the destruction of socialist institutions, namely central planning and
state enterprises, China has concentrated on construction of market insti-
tutions, namely private enterprises, investment systems, stock and bond
markets, workable price mechanisms, and most recently modem banks. If
one defines the goal as decreasing the share of socialist production in
GNP, then one can say that Poland has focused on decreasing the nu-
merator while China has focused on increasing the denominator. The
denominator is more malleable, and increasing it expands popular wel-
fare.
William Overholt, The Rise of China's Economy, Bus. ECON., Apr. 1994, at 29, 34.
For an examination of Chinese privatization via state sector reform and
private equity participation in state enterprises converted into joint stock compa-
nies, see discussion infra subparts IV.B.2 & B.3.
32. What can or should be done about the decrepit and bankrupt state sector
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China necessarily meant privatization by means other than
transfer of state assets into private hands. Thus, against the
more popular tide sweeping Russia and Eastern Europe, pri-
vatization in China must, by ideological necessity, mean pri-
vatization through the creation of a nonstate sector separate
and distinct from the state.
A completely different scenario can be found in the former
Soviet bloc. As the Berlin Wall collapsed, the sense of political
urgency and unlimited possibility spilled into the economic
sector. All specters from the Communist past were to be elimi-
nated. The future was to be structurally and wholly reinvent-
ed, but in the image and likeness of the old Europe with which
the Eastern bloc had once shared a common vision and from
which it had mistakenly withdrawn. For the former Eastern
bloc, immediate divestment of state ownership rights was a
political, moral and, by implication, an economic good.
Moreover, this divestment of state ownership rights was to
be immediate because "the process of privatization entails
enormous risks, and there [was] a real possibility that the
process [w]ould still become paralyzed."33 Thus, in order to
forestall political opposition from interest groups adversely
affected by privatization such as labor unions, old Party mem-
bers, and former owners intent on reclaiming their property,
privatization had to be implemented as swiftly as possible in
order to prevent its opponents from "get[ting] their tentacles
around the state enterprises."
Moreover, the appeal of immediate state sector privatiza-
tion lies not in its unambiguous rupture with the past, but in
its steering of the economy in a direction which has great polit-
ical appeal. Because market economies worked well in the
West, because central planning did not work in the East, and
because there was no time to experiment with alternative
paths, the headlong rush to a Western-style economy has an
understandable attraction. Because stripping the state of own-
ership rights is seen as the quickest path towards such an
is a question that haunts reformers in China. See discussion infra parts IV.B.1 &
B.2.
For China, in particular, a country of approximately 1,152,428,417 individu-
als in approximately 300,388,130 households in 22 provinces and five autonomous
regions and three special municipalities, see Gong, supra note 7, at 30, the risk
for social unrest and dislocation cannot be minimized.
33. Sachs, supra note 1, at 16.
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economy, privatization has been considered a prerequisite to a
successful transition.
Thus, while each country in Eastern Europe might have
adopted a different privatization strategy,34 most embraced
the privatization of state enterprises as the linchpin of market
reform. Privatization has unrealistically been seen as a pana-
cea for unmanageable bureaucracy, inefficiency, and bankrupt-
cy. Because innovation, efficiency, growth, and incentives are
believed to be magical properties somehow associated with
"privatization," it is believed that the process alone will convert
losses into profits, albeit with a certain number of social and
political costs. In Poland, for example, "the government posi-
tion is that privatization ... should precede enterprise restruc-
turing."35 Similarly, "[cIonsidering it more important to pri-
vatize state property quickly than to finalize all the details of a
market economy," the Czech Republic announced as early as
1993 that it planned to privatize 2,100 state enterprises worth
approximately $17 billion. 6 Even though it is acknowledged
34. See Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Poland, 17 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 84 (1993) (privatization in
the Czech Republic primarily by the voucher coupon method-selling voucher cou-
pon booklets to be used by eligible citizens for bidding of shares in state firms
and direct sales to foreign investors; privatization in Slovakia by public tenders,
public auctions, direct sales and to a lesser degree, the distribution of shares
through coupon privatization; privatization in Poland through privatization coupons
and investment funds); see also Sachs, supra note 1, at 18-25 (privatization by
initial public offerings, transfer of ownership to insiders, outsider privatization and
sales and transfers to financial intermediaries).
35. Sachs, supra note 1, at 15 n.1 (emphasis added).
36. Balfour & Crise, supra note 34, at 96.
This naive belief in the emerging market economies, encouraged on occa-
sion by enthusiasts from the West, is that, with the large state-owned
enterprises, all that is needed is to change the ownership from the state
to private persons. The motivation of the new owners would engender
those efficient systems of production so characteristic of the West and so
lacking in the East.
Sir Alan Walters, The Transition to a Market Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF
MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 102-03 (Christopher Clague & Gordon C.
Rausser eds., 1992).
Hence, there was a lack of meaningful pre-privatization restructuring of the
type occurring in China.
There was thought to be no point in trying to reform the existing state-
owned enterprises while they remained in state ownership . . . . One of
the enduring features of all emerging market economies, whatever their
state of reform, has been the persistence of nomenklatura management.
It is doubtful that any political leader in Eastern Europe will seriously
attempt the Herculean task of sorting the sheep from the goats among
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that other ingredients are needed to implement a workable pri-
vate market economy, it is also widely believed that the change
from state to private ownership itself will result in the creation
of a well-functioning capital market."
Western institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund have further encouraged state
sector privatization and, in some cases, made it a prerequisite
for further financial assistance. 8 For example, the prescrip-
tion for the former Soviet Union stated that "the ultimate goal
of ownership reform is to privatize almost all enterprises. "39
Furthermore, the World Bank concluded that "privatization is
necessary and highly desirable, even though difficult and time-
consuming."40 The reason, of course, for placing so much faith
in privatization is that it has been assumed that "only private
owners can establish an enduring basis for self-financing and
managerial independence."
4 1
Thus, preprivatization restructuring could not be as impor-
tant as privatization itself. Again, ideology plays a large part
in this determination. State firms were seen as vestiges from
the past and were associated with inefficiency and
unprofitability. Restructuring them was not as politically ap-
pealing as turning them over to private owners who could do a
much better job of converting struggling enterprises into com-
mercial viabilities. Thus, enterprise reform lies at the low end
of the agenda, while sweeping transfer of state property rights
the nomenklatura. They hope, instead, that privatization will do the sort-
ing for them.
Id. at 103.
37. While various additional measures such as the institution of bankruptcy
procedures to facilitate enterprise liquidation, "legal guidelines and procedures of a
normal corporation," or "[blasic concepts of property management" are recommend-
ed, these measures are designed to accompany, not precede, state sector privatiza-
tion. Sachs, supra note 1, at 28.
38. See, e.g., John A. Peeler, Alarm Bell for Third-World Democracies, CHRIS-
TIAN SCL MONITOR, Mar. 13, 1992, at 19 (because pro-privatization policies of the
IMF are part of the politically dominant prescriptions for ailing economies, govern-
ments such as Third World governments have no choice but to adopt such poli-
cies).
39. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ET AL., supra note 10, at 26.
40. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1991: THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 10, at 144.
41. Kimio Uno, Privatization and the Creation of a Commercial Banking Sys-
tem, in WHAT Is TO BE DONE? PROPOSALS FOR THE SOVIET TRANSITION TO THE
MARKET 150 (Merton Peck & Thomas Richardson eds., 1991).
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to private owners remains at the top.
That is not to say, of course, that no attempts have been
made to improve state enterprises before they are privatized.
Nor has privatization been the only method of reform in East-
ern Europe. After all, even the most ardent advocates of pri-
vatization admit that while it is "the key element of the trans-
formation process, " " "complementary policy initiatives and
success in other areas, such as the legal environment, macro-
economic policy, and financial and labor markets are required
to achieve the ultimate objectives."4" However, wholesale, im-
mediate state sector privatization remains the centerpiece of
the Eastern European model. Even though it may be but one
part of a complex endeavor to construct a market economy, the
overall package is still one that requires the immediate intro-
duction of free prices, the removal of subsidies, and the imple-
mentation of traditionally recognizable private property rights.
Thus, even a perfunctory comparison of the Eastern Euro-
pean with the Chinese model will reveal stark differences. In
all respects, China's method of privatization goes against the
dogmatic prescription for privatization ordained by Western
reformers. Although embraced by Eastern Europe, immediate
privatization of existing state enterprises, traditionally con-
sidered to be a prerequisite for a truly reformed economy, has
been rejected by China.
42. MANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
43. Id.
In addition, while state sector privatization remains the dominant method of
creating a market economy and demands significant investment in resources and
capital from the government, there is also no denying the existence of a private
sector in Eastern Europe. When the governments of Poland, Hungary, and Czecho-
slovakia permitted the formation of private companies in 1989 and 1990, the re-
sponse was indeed positive. For example, the numbers of registered private enter-
prises increased in Poland between 1989 and 1991 to 45,000. Leila Webster, Pri-
vate Sector Manufacturing in Eastern Europe: Some Cross-Country Comparisons, in
CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORM-
ING COMMUNIST STATES 177 (Vedat Milor ed., 1994).
Still, the private sector accounts for only a small percentage of economic
output-one half of one percent of non-agricultural output in Czechoslovakia and
eight percent in Poland. Lawrence Summers, The Next Decade in Central and
Eastern Europe, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE,
supra note 36, at 29. The Polish private sector has grown from "15,000 in 1989 to
more than 61,000 by March 1993" despite the government's lack of attention to
fostering its growth. David Gordon, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Polish
Experience, 25 LAW & POLVY INT'L BUS. 517, 552 (1994).
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Instead, China has opted for a model founded on the cre-
ation of a nonstate sector. This model is occasionally described
derisively as only a "traditional form of privatization [which]
occurs when the state withdraws altogether from certain eco-
nomic activities and creates an opportunity for private entre-
preneurs to act in such fields."44 Precisely because most com-
mentators believe that the "mere" introduction of private en-
terprise into the economy is only privatization in its initial,
traditional stage,45 the Chinese model, with its emphasis on a
new, enterprising nonstate sector, is all the more uncommon.
In effect, it represents a complete rejection of the orthodox
view of privatization.46 As more fully described below, in Chi-
na, the immediate privatization of state enterprises is viewed
neither as a necessary economic corollary to the institution of
market-oriented behavior, nor deemed worthy of the political
and social costs that would inevitably accompany such a pro-
cess.
Because of the sense of historical and economic imperative
that has swept Eastern Europe, the Chinese approach probably
would not have been palatable there. However, while the Chi-
nese model may not be an ideologically feasible or politically
appealing alternative, the uncontested economic success it has
produced should present some evidence against the more domi-
nant Eastern European paradigm.
44. Tamds Horvdth, State Shrinkage in Hungary in the 1980s, in PRIVATIZA-
TION AND DEREGULATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 413 (Dennis J. Gayle & Jona-
than N. Goodrich eds., 1990) (emphasis added).
45. See supra text accompanying note 12.
46. Under the orthodox view, privatization is desirable not just because it cre-
ates the correct market incentives in the newly privatized firms but also because
it serves to clarify muddled property relations and rights. As some have observed,
[tlo a western-trained economist, the centrality and immediacy to any
transformation process of establishing well-defined property seems so self
evident as to hardly merit discussion. It is little wonder that, leaving
aside the sometimes more immediate issues of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, the officially sanctioned position of Western governments and inter-
national lending organizations places the highest priority on the aggres-
sive and rapid establishment of well-defined property rights.
MARTIN WEITZMAN & CHENGGANG XU, VAGUELY DEFINED COOPERATIVES AND COOP-
ERATIVE CULTURE: A RECONCILIATION OF A PARADOXICAL PHENOMENON IN TRANSI-
TIONAL ECONOMIES 2 (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper
No. 1607, 1992).
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C. Social and Economic Considerations: China Compared to
Eastern Europe
At the heart of Chinese privatization is a prosperous and
thriving nonstate economy tenuously connected to the state
sector yet free from its grip.47 Even though China's ideological
quandary might have forced the country's reformers to initially
channel the tide of privatization into the creation of a nonstate
sector 48 as a supplement to the more dominant state sector,
47. Because privatization of the state sector is a process separate from the
creation of a private sector, both analytically distinct phenomena should be evalu-
ated independently of one another. Thus, because there are costs attached to both
the privatization of state sector institutions and the creation of a private sector, a
transitional economy may be faced with a tradeoff-the difficult choice of doing
what when.
For example, "the creation of a commercial code is probably more important
to the new entrepreneurs who are building new commercial relationships and who
do not have the backing of the state, than to the state sector firms with their
traditional ties." Peter Murrell, Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Re-
form of the Centrally Planned Economies, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONO-
MIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 36, at 35, 51 n.32. Thus, a tradeoff occurs
when the creation of a private sector framework conducive to entry of new firms
receives lower priority in state resources than the creation of state sector privat-
ization schemes.
48. There are generally four categories of firms in the non-state sector: indi-
vidually owned firms, foreign-invested firms, TVEs, and urban collectives. See
SHANG-JIN WEI & PENG LIAN, LOVE AND HATE: STATE AND NON-STATE FIRMS IN
TRANSITION ECONOMIES (Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies,
Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
Pacific Basin Working Paper Series No. PB 93-10, 1993). Only the first two are
completely privately owned. Individually owned firms, whether rural or urban,
consist primarily of enterprises subsumed under the categories of "private econo-
my" and "individual economy." See infra note 135 for an account of the status of
the private economy and the individual economy in China and the Chinese Consti-
tution. For an account of the development of the foreign-invested enterprise in
China, see MARGARET PEARSON, JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (1991); see generally Moser, supra note 29. Article 18 of the 1982 Constitu-
tion provides that "[tihe People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises,
other foreign economic organizations and individual foreigners to invest in China
and to enter into various forms of economic co-operation with Chinese enterprises
and other economic organizations in accordance with the law of the People's Re-
public of China." ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution] [XIANFA
(1982)] art. 18.
Because of the protean and obscure state of property rights in China, the
focus of this paper is not on how certain enterprises are officially or nominally
categorized by the Chinese authorities. Indeed, as Pradumna Rana, senior econo-
mist of the Asian Development Bank once remarked, "'enterprises [still] operate in
a sort of limbo between public and private ownership, with rights and responsibili-
ties of management and ownership unclear in both practice and law.'" Ramon
Isberto, China Development: From Boom to Bust?, Inter Press Service, May 11,
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there are socioeconomic reasons to support this model as well.
Socialist ideology may have dictated this particular path of
reform. Nevertheless, this method of privatization has allowed
China to create a market-oriented sector, while freeing it from
the socially disruptive task of dismantling the gargantuan and
dinosaurish state sector.49
Indeed, advocates of the shock therapy school of reform
have sought to cast China's experience in a negative light by
highlighting the fact that the Chinese path is more a product
of constraint than of deliberative strategy."0 These advocates
contend that China's reformers were forced by political divi-
sions within the Communist Party to operate within the con-
text of "socialism with Chinese characteristics," and that there-
fore, China's model of reform was "happened upon" through
pure serendipity. They argue that it is a model thrust upon
China by a deficit of choice and a lack of both vision and con-
sensus. Saddled with such illegitimate origins, China's method
of privatization is no model at all because it cannot fairly be
called a true strategy of reform.
Whether it is a model or an accident, it cannot be denied
that the Chinese experience challenges economic dogma and
presents legitimate alternatives for other transitional econo-
mies.5 True, Chinese privatization may have had its origins
1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, INPRES File. This Article's focus,
therefore, is not on the ambiguity of boundaries that exist between different types
of firms but rather on a very unambiguous phenomenon-the rise of a sector
which has led to a decrease in the importance of the state sector and an increase
in productivity in a sphere outside the control of the state. In addition, it should
be noted that the terms "private sector" and "nonstate sector" are used inter-
changeably in this Article and that privately owned firms, foreign-invested enter-
prises, TVEs, and urban collectives are all considered to be in the private or non-
state sector (although only the first two are truly privately owned).
49. By contrast, the struggle for ownership claims has taken center stage in
Russia. The campaign for privatization was launched even though conflicting
claims for ownership by groups other than the state (for example, managers, work-
ers, municipal officials) were being waged. See Louis Uchitelle, East's Problems in
Going Private, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at D2.
The model spearheaded by China would defer state sector privatization until
a private sector has been created with the capacity to generate enough growth
both to overtake the state sector and to absorb some of the social disruptions
state sector reform would unleash. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Sachs & Woo, supra note 11, at 31-33.
51. Whether or not the Chinese model should be an antidote or an alternative
to "shock therapy," its success at the very least indicates that before countries
such as Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, Russia and others from the ex-Soviet Union
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in the dictates of China's political imperatives. However, this
alone does not mean that it is irrelevant to other transitional
economies or that it is somehow stripped of all social and eco-
nomic legitimacy.
Rather, there are three primary socioeconomic benefits to
be derived from the deferral of state sector privatization in
favor of first creating a nonstate sector. First, given the inevi-
table economic tradeoffs involved in the transition process, it
may be more beneficial for transitional economies to devote
limited resources to favor the creation of a new, nonstate sec-
tor over privatization of the state sector. Second, given the
social costs and disruption that inevitably accompany state
sector privatization, it may make more social sense to establish
a new, nonstate sector vibrant enough to absorb some of the
dislocation when and if state sector privatization is implement-
ed. Third, given the fact that state sector privatization may not
be effective unless a market framework already exists, the
sequencing of reform may need to be reversed so that the es-
tablishment of a market framework should take precedence
over the mass transfer of ownership rights.
There are sound economic reasons for committing econom-
ic and creative resources to the creation of a market frame-
work rather than the adaptation or destruction of the state
sector. Indeed, given the fact that limited resources are avail-
able, some economists have noted that
too many hopes have been invested in privatization and rath-
er too much intellectual, social, and political capital is being
consumed in the process of privatization. The argument is
strengthened when the efforts behind privatization are con-
trasted to the lack of attention being paid to creating and fos-
tering the development of new private sector firms. 52
Thus, while some economists have acknowledged that true
innovation and growth can come only from the emergence of a
new private sector rather than the restructuring of established
state enterprises, such "emphases are not the major focus of
become testing grounds for "shock therapy," this all-too-common prescription for
ailing transitional economies should be subjected to further scrutiny.
52. Murrell, supra note 47, at 45. "In many Eastern European countries, poli-
cy toward the private sector can be characterized, at best, as one of benign ne-
glect." Id
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the majority of discussions of the transition process." 3
Because the privatization debate has been defined by the
desires and experiences of the former Soviet bloc to reenter the
family of Europe, alternative approaches to privatization have
been excluded from the possibilities drawn by the more domi-
nant Eastern European model. Thus, although the predica-
ments of certain developing countries are similar enough to the
transitional economies of China and Eastern Europe to war-
rant comparison,54 the commonalities in their experiences
have not been adequately noted. For instance, despite the
obvious differences in institutional structure of the market in
the two regions, the desire for increased production and great-
er productivity have meant that "[i]n each instance, institu-
tions must be adapted or created to generate new earnings
streams."55 In those developing countries where reform has
been more or less successful, "growth has taken place primari-
ly through the emergence of new activities, not through the
adaptation of older ones."55
Because Eastern Europe has focused on the privatization
of existing state enterprises,
the biggest drawback Eastern Europe may have is an under-
standable but nonetheless misplaced fixation on the old as-
sets ....
Important questions are what the old assets are worth
and whether they are worth enough to be occupying as much
time, attention and scarce'resources of politicians, finance
ministries and ministries of ownership as they have, in fact,
been given.57
The administrative complexities of valuation alone have made
it difficult to assign a market value to assets which have previ-
ously had none.5" Because accounting systems employed by
53. "Ilt is quite unusual to find authors who emphasize the costliness of the
privatization process and the need to slow down this process in order to channel
resources to the new private sector." Id. at 48 n.18.
54. See Anne Krueger, Institutions for the New Private Sector, in THE EMER-
GENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 36, at 219, 219-23.
55. Id. at 220.
56. Id. at 221. Growth in Turkey and Korea, for example, occurred primarily
from emerging economic activities, not from privatization or adaptation of old ones.
Id. at 221-22.
57. Id. at 222.
58. For a detailed discussion of valuation problems and suggested solutions,
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centrally planned economies are simply not transferable to
market economies, they give at best an inadequate and unreli-
able value of the state enterprises at issue. A wholesale adop-
tion of generally accepted accounting principles takes time to
implement. Thus, state sector privatization will have to initial-
ly proceed with accounting standards devised on a case-by-case
basis.59 In the absence of a mature market and a developed
pricing system, valuation is unreliable, time consuming, and
expensive. For example, "the high valuation fees charged by
foreign accounting and auditing companies have become a
political problem in Poland." °
State enterprises saddled with debt must either have that
debt forgiven or restructured. Market prospects for such firms
have to be reevaluated. These are not easy tasks given the
uncertainties in Eastern Europe."' These difficulties are com-
pounded by the fact that valuation methods for the very same
firm may produce inconsistencies. To sidestep some of these
difficulties, formal valuations have occasionally been bypassed
and the purchase price subjected to an after-sale adjustment,
when market conditions have been clarified.62
Aside from valuation costs, there are also high transaction
costs given the large amount of time, energy, and resources
that must be devoted to devising and administering mass pri-
vatization campaigns. The multiplicity of schemes, for example,
include public offerings, public auctions, sales to private buyers
or institutional investors (such as banks or financial intermedi-
aries), buyouts by insiders (including management), and res-
titution actions by former owners.
Moreover, in Eastern Europe, the utter lack of domestic
capital has created the political and economic dilemma of how
see Robert J. Toltzman, Valuation Issues-Problems and Solutions, in
BUTTERWORTHS PRIVATISATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 61 (Stephen A.
Rayner ed., 1992); Gordon, supra note 43, at 531-33. These valuation problems,
combined with political and social insecurity, caused foreign investors to shy away
from purchasing Polish companies. Balfour & Crise, supra note 34, at 113.
59. Hans J. Blommenstein et al., Privatising Large Enterprises: Overview of
Issues and Case Studies, in CENTRE FOR CO-OPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN ECON-
OMIES IN TRANSITION & ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, METHODS OF PRIVATISING LARGE ENTERPRISES 16 (1993).
60. Jan Szomburg, Poland: Country Study, in METHODS OF PRIVATISING LARGE
ENTERPRISES, supra note 59, at 97.
61. Blommestein, supra note 59, at 16.
62. Id.
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to sell assets to domestic buyers who have no capital; hence
the quandary between efficiency and equity. To maximize the
goals of efficiency, state assets must be transferred to those
most capable of increasing their efficiency. To generate much
needed capital, state assets must be sold to those with suffi-
cient capital to purchase such assets. The conflict, of course,
arises when those with the requisite managerial expertise and
capital pool are unlikely to be citizens and much more likely to
be foreigners.
Most Eastern European countries have adopted the politi-
cally appealing voucher system, which involves the free dis-
tribution of vouchers to citizens who can in turn exchange such
vouchers for shares in the privatized enterprises. While the
dispersion of vouchers creates equitable and widespread pri-
vate ownership and at the same time permits Eastern Europe
to avoid valuation difficulties, such benefits may have come at
the expense of efficiency. Domestic owners lack the necessary
capital to continue investing in the privatized firms as well as
the management know-how to create new markets and en-
hance efficiency. The wide dispersion of vouchers may have
also created a diluted shareholding system without any true
ownership interest. Therefore, Eastern Europe has devised a
scheme whereby such vouchers can be traded for shares in
financial intermediaries, which, like Western holding compa-
nies, may either own the entire privatized enterprises, or, like
Western mutual funds, may own a certain percentage of shares
in the privatized enterprises. However, under either scenario,
the costs are certainly not negligible. Such mass privatization
schemes can be complex and cumbersome to regulate and ad-
minister and may require the involvement of a multiplicity of
institutions including voucher agents, stock exchanges, and
investment funds.
Thus, limited financial and creative resources may be
better utilized if they are devoted to the creation of institutions
that foster the rapid emergence of a private sector.63 A further
economic tradeoff between privatizing the state sector and
creating a new nonstate sector exists, for example, in the di-
version of limited resources from one goal to the other. Thus,
63. Krueger, supra note 54, at 222-23. Commercial codes, legal procedures,
and a tax collection system are necessary in the framework of incentives to foster
the growth of small businesses.
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any surplus generated by the state sector during the transi-
tional period can be used either to devise auction schemes,
outright sales, or voucher distribution, or it can be used by the
state to finance the growth of new companies.
The Chinese experience represents this latter approach. In
China, there is undoubtedly a clear and demonstrable correla-
tion between the growth of a dynamic nonstate sector and the
success of China's economic reform." More importantly, the
proliferation of a nonstate sector in China seems to have been
stimulated by the initial presence of state firms. To develop its
nonstate sector, China simply removed barriers to entry, thus
permitting private initiatives to take root while leaving its
state sector firms more or less intact. Instead of being con-
strained by existing state enterprises, however, these private
businesses seemed to have benefited from the presence of the
state sector.
In fact, a study of 434 Chinese cities revealed that in the
initial phases of reform, state firms appeared to have promoted
and stimulated the growth of nonstate firms.65 Like other cen-
trally planned economies, the purchase of inputs and the sale
of outputs in China tend to remain intertwined with the cen-
tralized network of the old central planning system, despite
efforts to extricate the economy from the dictates of the plan.
Thus, once the state takes steps to enable private businesses to
form, and once private businesses do in fact manage to enter
the economic mainstream, instead of having to sink or swim,
they find themselves in the enviable position of not having to
worry about input supply and output market. Because state
firms are already involved in the "downstream and upstream
of the production process,"66 an established market for pur-
chases and sales exists. Thus, the state firms' demand for new
products alone may be crucial for the continued viability of
newly emerging private firms. 7
64. Like China, Taiwan and Korea have both transformed their state-domi-
nated economies not by privatizing state firms but primarily by giving birth to
firms outside the state sectors. See WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 3 n.2.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id. at 5.
67. The mere announcement of a privatization program for state enterprises
tends to result in significant decline in output, because workers and managers
whose jobs are threatened no longer are motivated to continue their current level
of production. This lack of motivation could retard the growth of new private
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By contrast, "if one closes the state firms all at once at the
beginning of a reform, the existing interfirm production chains
are also severed."61 In other words, the sudden withdrawal of
the state may create a gap in the production and distribution
chain that may take years for private businesses to fill. Of
course, hypothetically, all entrepreneurs could form new busi-
nesses to generate demand for each other's supplies and to
provide mutual production and distribution chains.69 Howev-
er, this scenario is unlikely to happen, and therefore the "econ-
omy can be stuck in a nongrowth equilibrium."70 Once a pri-
vate sector has emerged, however, the authors of this study
concluded that the dismantling of inefficient state firms should
indeed begin.7'
The peculiar dynamics created by a state sector initially
coexisting with an emerging nonstate sector may also give the
newly-established private firms the advantage of "free-riding
on the social safety net" financed and borne by the old state
sector.7 2 For example, while a state owned firm pays between
45% and 55% of its profits in income tax, a nonstate sector
enterprise, such as a township village enterprise, pays only
35% while foreign-invested firms pay only 15% if they are
located in specially designated economic zones.73 Thus, a Chi-
nese family will often have one person working in the state
sector to secure social welfare benefits provided by the state74
firms, which would no longer be aided by the interfirm linkage provided by state
sector firms. Id. at 6-7.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 6. China is currently at the stage where the authors of this study
believe it is in fact time to undertake genuine reform of the state sector. See infra
notes 223-37 and accompanying text.
72. WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 8.
73. Id. at 9 n.5.
74. State enterprises have traditionally provided workers with comprehensive
benefit packages such as pensions, subsidized housing, medical care, child care,
food, and recreation facilities. Interestingly enough, proponents of "shock therapy"
have used this very fact-the generous state sector benefits-to explain why a
country like Russia has not been able to encourage workers to leave the comforts
of the state sector for the less secure private sector. As Sachs and Woo explained,
because Russia's workers are primarily urban and employed by state enterprises
which also act as social welfare providers, and because, unlike China, Russia does
not have a huge agricultural sector with surplus labor willing to move from the
rural economy to the new nonstate or private economy, Russia has had no choice
but to take the bitter medicines of "shock therapy" reform. See Sachs & Woo,
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and another person working in the private sector to generate
higher income.75 As the Chinese experience demonstrates,
even after market-supportive measures have been instituted,
the state sector may very well play a beneficent role in the
emergence of private-oriented businesses.
There is yet an additional reason to defer state sector
privatization. The state cannot simply afford to withdraw from
the economic foreground, for, as the paradox has been noted
even by the more ardent proponents of privatization, "the most
important aspect of the transition to a spontaneously function-
ing market economy cannot be initiated by market forces
themselves. Indeed, the only force powerful enough to set the
market forces in motion is the very state that is supposed to
remove itself from the picture." 6
The economic benefits of the Chinese model are clear, but
the social benefits are equally compelling. Instead of eradicat-
ing the state sector from the economy, China has opted to
reconfigure its economic universe through a combination of
state and nonstate sector economies.77 The synergy derived
supra note 11, at 25. But see Barry Naughton, Reforming a Planned Economy: Is
China Unique?, in FROM REFORM TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN
TRANSITION IN ASIA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 49, 67-
68.
75. WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 9 n.6.
76. FRYDMAN & RAPACYNZSKI, supra note 14, at 57.
During the early stage of reform, when monitoring mechanisms, banking
regulation, securities regulation, and accounting standards are either absent or
ineffective, the decision has to be made as to who "is to exert the necessary de-
gree of control over the actions of economic agents in order to preserve budgetary,
financial, and monetary stability during the early stages of reform." Murrell, supra
note 47, at 50. Either the free market or existing state institutions can be used
'on a selective and temporary basis to exert control over the state enterprises in
the period before privatization and creation of market institutions." Id.
77. Is China's model portable to other transitional economies or is it grounded
in structures and conditions that are specifically Chinese? Some economists have
argued that Chinese privatization took the shape it did primarily because the
relatively small size of the state sector allowed reformers to ignore or defer state
sector privatization and focus on private sector creation. See generally, e.g., Sachs
& Woo, supra note 11.
Under this theory, the following initial but unique conditions made China's
model workable: a small state sector and a large agricultural sector with a surplus
reservoir of agricultural workers. This combination enabled the government to
perform the relatively easy task of shifting labor from the rural economy to the
newly formed private sector and avoid the more difficult task of populating the
new private sector with state sector workers siphoned from the generously subsi-
dized state sector, which the government would have had to do had China not
BROOK. J. INTL L.
from this interaction allows China to avoid collapse caused by
the destruction of the old economy before alternative market
forces can be introduced. By virtue of this dual-track approach,
transition costs and instability can be kept at a minimum
because the preserved state sector is able to provide a kind of
social and economic anchor during the tumultuous beginnings
of the market. Further, the newly emerging private sector can
in turn act as a shock-absorber if and when the state sector is
privatized."
Aside from the social and economic considerations de-
scribed above, creating a nonstate sector before destroying the
state sector might be a more effective means than mass privat-
ization at fostering competition, efficiency, and market-sup-
portive institutions. The Chinese model thus focuses on how to
create market forces, not how to transfer state assets to pri-
vate hands. And the implication, of course, is that unless mar-
ket institutions have been created and secured, privatization of
the state sector is ineffective.
In this very fundamental respect, then, the Chinese model
is diametrically opposed to the Eastern European model. East-
ern European faith in state sector privatization rests on the
premise that the change from state to private ownership itself
is the necessary trigger to catalytically construct a market
economy. Starting from that premise, the following prescrip-
tion makes perfect sense. "[Without privatisation no mean-
ingful market conditions could begin to exist.""9 Under this
been "blessed" with such a large pool of unemployed and unskilled peasant work-
ers.
To explain why Russia could not have adopted China's model, the following
Russian conditions were noted: heavy state subsidies of both state-owned farms in
Russia and state-owned industries. Thus, workers from neither sector would have
been willing to move from their heavily subsidized enterprises into the new,
nonsecure, nonsubsidized, nonstate sector-unless state sector subsidies were either
drastically reduced or eliminated. Russia, therefore, did not have access to a ready
reservoir of surplus workers to shift into a newly legalized private economy. More-
over, because the Russian state sector was so large, Russian privatization had to
start with state sector privatization.
78. However, China has encountered pitfalls and has had to backtrack. For
example, economic retrenchment after Tiananmen in 1989 was reversed in 1991
after a severe depression in economic growth. In a report designed to demonstrate
renewed commitment to market reforms, General Secretary Jiang Zemin "strongly
reaffirmed the importance of private and collective enterprises." Jiang "emphasized
the urban . . . sector as an area of future growth that could absorb workers dis-
placed by reforms in the State sector." Miller, supra note 22, at 28.
79. Salvatore Zecchini, Critical Issues in Privatisation, in METHODS OF
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theory, the transformation in ownership itself provides the
necessary incentives required to induce recently privatized
organizations to respond in new ways.
The transfer of State ownership is essential to create compe-
tition among enterprises in the market place, to promote
entrepreneurship and risk taking in economic initiatives, to
spur innovation in production and management and to favour
the development of a new managerial class that is fully com-
mitted to achieving cost efficiency in combining different
factors of production."
Although this strategy needs to be supplemented with
other strategies such as fostering "the emergence of market
participants and entrepreneurs that... are neither fully nor
mainly under the direct control of the State-owner, [t]he trans-
fer of public-owned firms into private hands is the main ave-
nue to obtain this result in a short period."'"
Thus, according to the East European model of privatiza-
tion, state sector privatization sets a market economy in mo-
tion and makes it function. The question, of course, is how a
market can possibly function if it has not yet been established.
Nonetheless, proponents of state sector privatization are con-
vinced that the removal of the state from its management and
ownership roles in the economy will put the workings of a well-
functioning market into action.
It is the typical chicken and egg problem. Can a simple
transfer of ownership from the state to the private sector cre-
ate the institutional environment necessary for a successful
transition?2 Or is a market-conducive environment consisting
of private businesses, reformed state enterprises and a legal
infrastructure equipped with banking laws, commercial and
civil codes, stock market regulation, modern accounting and
PRIVATISING LARGE ENTERPRISES, supra note 59, at 72.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Of course, even its most ardent advocates do not believe that privatization
alone will cure all ills. However, privatization is still viewed as the centerpiece of
the reform process. See, e.g., MANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. "Privatization of
large-scale, state-owned enterprises depends on and is part of a complex effort to
achieve the private market economy." Id. at 4. In this regard, it is believed that
the transfer of "ownership, control, and monitoring of firms will affect their con-
duct, and therefore the economic outcome of reforms." Id. at 3.
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auditing system, and other regulatory agencies a prerequisite
to state sector privatization?
Ideologically as well as economically, China has been skep-
tical that privatizing the state sector could impart any mean-
ingful benefits when implemented in the absence of an estab-
lished market framework. Privatization will not spawn the
benefits of competition or efficiency unless market forces have
taken root. The Chinese model assumes that without the right
market conditions, the newly privatized entity has no reason to
act competitively if the new environment in which it finds
itself is devoid of other competitive firms. Additionally, the
privatized firm has no incentive to respond to consumer de-
mands if the scarcity of consumer goods means that any and
all goods produced by the firm will be consumed.83 Sharehold-
er control over management may not even be feasible if the
ownership structure is too diffuse, either because domestic
shareholders have insufficient capital to purchase large blocks
of shares or because foreign investors are unwilling or unable
to own a controlling share.
The central question for transitional economies is: what
should be put in place first, private enterprises or competitive
capital markets? For China, it is competitive capital markets.
III. THE CREATION OF THE CHINESE NON-STATE SECTOR
China was successful in establishing a sector of nonstate
firms responsible for its record growth rate by adopting the
right combination of initial conditions: a comprehensive legal
infrastructure, rural decollectivization in favor of smaller-based
household farming resulting in significant increases in produc-
tivity, income, and surplus capital. The increase in household
savings combined with the shift towards light consumer indus-
tries have led to the establishment and proliferation of new
economic organizations called the township village enterprises
(TVE) further responsible for China's strong economic condi-
tion.
This section examines China's step-by-step transformation
83. Poland faced a different problem. Trade liberalization at the very early
stages of reform led to a surge of imports into Poland which made it difficult if
not impossible for domestic goods to compete. See Vedat Milor, Changing Political
Economies: An Introduction, in CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES: PRIVATIZATION IN
POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST STATES, supra note 43, at 14.
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process and explores how each one contributed to future gains.
It also examines the emergence of the nonstate sector and
focuses on the TVE, one of the most productive economic enti-
ties in this newly emerging sector. Finally, it studies the non-
traditional corporate organization of TVEs and explores the
implications TVE productivity pose for conventional under-
standings of economic growth and property arrangements,
especially in the context of transitional economies.
A. Inducing Growth through Decollectivization, Household
Farming and Nonstate Entities
Since 1978 when China first instituted its open door poli-
cy, it has implemented the legal infrastructure of a market
economy. Examples include commercial and contract law, anti-
trust and labor law, environmental regulations, legislation
regarding foreign-invested enterprises such as joint ventures
and wholly foreign-owned companies, and regulations regard-
ing the acquisition and transfer of foreign exchange by
nonstate actors.' 4 Aside from establishing the requisite legal
infrastructure, it has also adopted courses of action which
together create the environment necessary to foster the emer-
gence of a new, nonstate economic sector.
How did China create this nonstate sector? As one econo-
mist has remarked, "factors of production need[ed] to be re-
leased to the new private sector." 5 For example, new entre-
preneurs must have capital, labor, and land at their disposal.
By first focusing on rural growth and reform86 and "generat-
ing huge increases in productivity, income, and output, with
negligible state investment,""7 China laid the groundwork for
84. For an overview of the legislative framework, see David Wall & Kiichiro
Fukasaku, China's Open Economy Reforms 1978-1992, in FROM REFORM TO
GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION IN ASIA AND CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 141, 152-55.
85. Christopher Clague, Introduction: The Journey to a Market Economy, in
THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 36, at 1,
11.
Land and building space should be made available; labor needs to move
out of the public sector, and loans should be provided. Since it is unlike-
ly that private banks would provide sufficient capital for the new private
sector if it is expanding at an appropriate speed, state banks will proba-
bly need to channel capital to new private enterprises.
86. By doubling the incomes of China's farmers, rural reforms had the imme-
diate result of benefiting 800 million people. OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 37.
87. Overholt, supra note 31, at 30. Agrarian land reform was begun in 1978
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an institutional structure which, in turn, generated sufficient
surplus capital to be reinvested in even more profitable enter-
prises.
In one of the more significant moves, China dissolved
farming communes in favor of household-based agriculture.
Commune-based agricultural lands were distributed en masse
to individual households which were granted a wide degree of
autonomy in production and marketing decisions so long as
certain production quotas were met."5 Because nonagricultur-
al assets formerly owned by the communes were sold at very
inexpensive prices, newly emerging businesses were also pro-
vided with an inexpensive source of assets with which to start
up production. 9
The state fostered initiatives and incentives by the institu-
tion of a "contract responsibility system,"9 whereby farmers
organized by household units9 are allowed to contract with
and resulted in China becoming "self-sufficient in food within two years." Diane
Francis, Election the Only Solution for Russia: Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev,
FIN. POST, Mar. 27, 1993 (weekly ed.), §5, at S3, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, ASIAPII File.
As a point of contrast, as of 1993, only three percent of Russian farms had
been privatized. Id.
88. Keun Lee, Making Another East Asian Success in China, in FROM REFORM
TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION IN ASIA AND CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 183, 190.
89. Id.
90. Robert Wessel, Reestablishing Private Business in Previously Socialist
Economies, BUS. ECON., Jan. 1992, at 30, 32; see also A Survey of Perestroika,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1990, at 59, 21 (describing the responsibility contract as a
system in which assets of the state are divided into household or "family plots"
designed to grant farmers a "leasehold" on the land). For a general definition, see
Article 27 of the General Principles of Civil Law, adopted by the Fourth Session
of the Sixth National People's Congress on April 12, 1986, effective as of January
1, 1987 ("[Tlhe members of rural collective economic organizations who engage in
commodity businesses within the scopes permitted by law and in accordance with
the provisions of responsibility contracts are rural management undertaking house-
holds").
A household enterprise is the smallest licensed unit for running a business
in China.
The responsibility contract system is not limited to rural areas but is popu-
larly utilized in urban enterprises as well. The underlying principle remains the
same: managers and workers of state enterprises enter into contractual relation-
ships with the state whereby performance goals are set. Anything above the stipu-
lated goal can be retained by the enterprise as distribution to the employees.
91. Andrew X. Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the
Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62, 74
(1993).
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the state to sell a set quantity of produce at an officially set
price. Any surplus generated by the household units can be
freely sold on the market at the market price.2 Within ten
years after rural reform was initiated, gross farm output in-
creased by a startling 138%. 3
The spectacular increase in output so significantly boosted
the farmers' cash reserves that most were able to finance new
projects themselves without having to resort to state loans. "In
effect, very hard budget constraints were imposed on farmers
(i.e., little credit was made available by the state banking
system) as they entered the market economy. Further, the
newly independent farmers viewed themselves as being under-
capitalized for financing on-farm investments, and they began
building up their cash reserves. " "
In fact, it is uncontested that China's household saving
rate is "unusually high even by East Asian standards."95
Household savings in China is approximately 23% of dispos-
able income as compared to 21% in Japan, 18% in Taiwan,
16% in Belgium, 13% in West Germany, and eight percent in
the United States." A significant proportion of these savings
is deposited into the state banking and rural credit cooperative
system to be extended either as loans to nonstate firms or
subsidies to state firms.
97
92. Wessel, supra note 90, at 33-34.
93. Id. at 34.
"This principle has been applied, in a more limited fashion, even in large
state enterprises. Various redrawn profit contracting schemes, and the eventual
replacement of profit remission by tax payments, has led to the increased reten-
tion of profit by firms rather than government." Andrew G. Walder, Corporate
Organization and Local Government Property Rights in China, in CHANGING POLIT-
ICAL EcoNoMIEs: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST
STATES, supra note 43, at 53, 58.
China's growth rate expanded at an annual average of 8.3% in real net
material product from 1978 to 1984, the first six years of reform. In contrast, the
Soviet economy recorded a bare 2.7% growth rate from 1986 to 1989, the first five
years of its reform. Lee, supra note 88, at 185.
94. Pradumna B. Rana & Wilhelmina Paz, Economies in Transition: The Asian
Experience, in FROM REFORM TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRAN-
SITION IN ASIA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 119, 127,
130.
95. Sachs & Woo, supra note 11, at 28.
96. Id. Before reforms were instituted in 1978, however, the average house-
hold saving rate in China was only two percent of household income. Naughton,
supra note 74, at 58.
97. Sachs & Woo, supra note 11, at 30 ("Loans are continuing to be injected
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The combination of each of the five intricately intertwined
factors described above (the dissolution of communes, the es-
tablishment of household-based family farming, the distribu-
tion of communal assets to family units, the "contract responsi-
bility system," and the increased household saving rate) creat-
ed the foundation for the emergence and proliferation of
nonstate enterprises in rural and urban areas of China. Thus,
while the dominance of state owned enterprises decreased, the
number of nonstate enterprises, most notably the TVEs en-
gaged in both rural and industrial-based production increased.
In fact, because "initial success[es] with the agricultural
reform brought in more than 800 million peasant families as a
strong support group for the reform," "s China took advantage
of this growth momentum and, in 1984, declared that similar
reforms would be extended to the urban areas. Indeed, it was
the "accumulation of wealth by rural families in China [which]
led to the emergence of nonfarm industrial production and
corresponding markets in rural and suburban towns and town-
ships."99 Because the Chinese economy, like other centrally
planned economies, had historically devoted a
disproportionately large portion of total resources to the state
coffers and military industrial complexes while neglecting the
production of consumer goods, it took but a modest amount of
resources to provide the needed corrective. Thus, when the
central government relaxed its monopolistic grip over industry
as early as 1979, many of the start-up firms rushing to fill the
void left by deregulation were rural industries organized along
market-based ownership lines. Ownership types included: col-
lective, private, or foreign ownership, and even some officially
listed as state owned because they had been sponsored by local
governments.,0 0
to enterprises which are obviously at the edge of bankruptcy. Some loans have
been used to pay wages, which have a pretty name: 'loans to keep social stabili-
ty.,).
98. Lee, supra note 88, at 185.
99. Id. at 190.
The phenomenal surge in surplus income derived from the dissolution of
communes and the establishment of household farming has provided one source of
capital used to create start-up businesses. Other sources include capital provided
by the Chinese diaspora, especially those from Hong Kong and Taiwan, whose
swift response as a source of foreign investment has resulted in the rapid develop-
ment of coastal provinces such as Guangdong and Fujian. Wall & Fukasaku, supra
note 84, at 156-57.
100. Naughton, supra note 74, at 58.
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Given such heavy distortions, even a modest shift in re-
source allocation from government to consumer goods manufac-
turing could effectively jump-start the nonstate economy, since
early entrants into this emerging and unexplored terrain were
able to earn rapid and hefty profits.'' Thus, the very distor-
tions that had plagued so many planned economies acted as
inducements to entrepreneurial and household businesses
eager to fill unexploited niches.0 2 In China, the rise of a ru-
ral economy in conjunction with the shift from heavy industrial
investment to light consumer goods production has created a
strong nonstate sector with a maximum of economic productivi-
ty and a minimum of transition costs. 103
A further breakdown will reveal even more distinctions among economic
entities within the nonstate sector: "foreign ventures, individual peasant farms,
individual businesses, private enterprises, small-scale rural and urban co-opera-
tives, and medium-sized rural and urban collective enterprises." Lee, supra note
88, at 202.
101. Naughton, supra note 74, at 50.
102. China, of course, is not alone in this regard. For example, the Polish pri-
vate sector grew from '15,000 in 1989 to more than 61,000 by March 1993" even
though the government made little attempt to foster its growth. Gordon, supra
note 43, at 552.
103. Is the Chinese model of maximum nonstate sector growth and minimum
state sector disruption applicable to other transitional economies? Certain initial
conditions in China's economic structure might have facilitated the implementation
of the two-track model: a relatively small state sector, a relatively small central
plan, and a relatively large agricultural sector with a surplus pool of peasant
workers combined to create optimal conditions for structural change. The state
could afford to ignore the state sector and simply draw on surplus rural workers
to create a new private sector. Sachs & Woo, supra note 11, at 23. Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam appear to be following the Chinese approach.
It has also been suggested that China has been additionally blessed by the
'advantage of backwardness," that is, that its lower level of income and skills
have helped its quest to enter world markets. By contrast, in order to penetrate
the international economic system, more economically advanced countries with a
close to full employment economy, such as the Eastern European countries, would
have to compete in the more competitive and technologically advanced sectors,
making the task of restructuring more difficult. How significant are these differ-
ences? Would different structural conditions in Russia, for example, mean that the
Chinese model is utterly inapplicable to the Russian experience? As one economist
has noted, while China had to transfer unskilled rural workers from the agricul-
tural sector to the new manufacturing based private sector, Russia would have
had to transfer state sector skilled urban workers to alternative nonstate sector
urban jobs, if it had pursued the Chinese model of private sector creation. See
Naughton, supra note 74, at 67-68. According to Naughton, a comparison of the
Chinese and the Russian and Eastern European experiences reveals that the latter
would have been faced with a less difficult task than China faced had they pur-
sued the Chinese model.
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Among the newly emerging firms within this robust
nonstate sector, the TVEs have exhibited remarkable growth
and output rates. With the growth of TVEs, production of con-
sumer goods for both the export and domestic market devel-
oped," 4 and indeed prospered at an unprecedented rate.'01
Between 1981 and 1990, TVE output grew at an average rate
of 29% per year while exports grew at an astounding average
rate of 66% per year.10 6 Exports by rural industrial enterpris-
es include light manufactured goods, such as textiles (which
account for one-fifth, or $6.5 billion of total exports in 1988),
chemicals, and even machinery.' 7 The TVE sector is now the
second largest in China's national economy, producing approxi-
mately 33% of all coal, 40% of all canned foods and 50% of
electric fans in China.' ° Thus, TVEs have contributed to eco-
nomic growth in China as well as to the increasing market
orientation of the nonstate sector.
B. Collective Enterprises: Township and Village Enterprises
As discussed above, TVEs came into being through a com-
bination of factors: the success of agricultural reforms, the
[The] ECEs [Eastern and Central European economies] do not need to
continuously generate millions of new jobs; they simply need to create
enough new jobs to absorb the workers shed by inefficient producers. In
that sense, a moderate growth of new firms should be able to gradually
draw workers away from inefficient state firms, and produce a transition
without massive amounts of socially destabilising unemployment. The
ECEs have the same unexploited niches that China has, but fewer re-
serves of grossly underutilised labour in the countryside. Thus, a strategy
of opening niches to new entrants should aid the restructuring process
more rapidly than in China.
Id. at 68.
Thus, despite initial differences in structural conditions (China's labor sur-
plus, large rural sector, unskilled peasants and lesser developed economy versus
Russia's relatively full employment, small rural sector, large urban industry,
skilled workers and more developed economy), a strategy of private sector develop-
ment, for reasons discussed in this Article, could have been a viable alternative to
immediate state sector privatization and its concomitant social and economic dislo-
cation.
104. Cairncross & Lin, supra note 26, at 13.
105. For an account of the home-grown private sector and the growth of small
TVEs, see Hong Kong's Economy Safe in China's Hands, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 12, 1993, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
106. WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 46, at 9.
107. Lee, supra note 88, at 190.
108. WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 46, at 9.
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availability of surplus rural labor, savings from increased agri-
cultural income, and increased consumer goods consumption
due to the rise in income.'0 9 Although TVEs are not privately
owned enterprises in the traditional sense, n° they do operate
outside the orbit of the state sector and are very different from
state sector firms. TVEs are "collectively owned"" but are
not subsidized by the state and have hard budget constraints.
They operate in a market environment by buying and selling
on the market completely outside of the state plan, and they
exercise much greater autonomy than state firms over their
production decisions." 2
Despite their market orientation, TVEs are not purely
private firms and are behaviorally as well as organizationally
distinct from both state and private sector enterprises. TVEs
are collectives often intricately intertwined with local govern-
ments. In this respect, TVEs exhibit behavior which reflect
their hybrid and nontraditional origins. First, even though
they are socially-based, they "must maintain financial respon-
sibility due to the limited financial means of local govern-
ments.""
While township and village officials control TVE proper-
ty rights, their incentives are not identical to those of private
owners. Township and village officials must take into account
the interests of the local community to some extent, if they
are to be effective in achieving a spectrum of economic and
social indicators."'
109. F. Gerard Adams, Economic Transition in China: What Makes China Dif-
ferent, in FROM REFORM TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION
IN ASIA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 215, 224.
110. TVEs are collectives and their members do not have a right of indivisible
ownership nor the right of exclusivity over the collective.
111. All members of the community are nominal owners and the community
government is the de facto owner. WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 46, at 11.
112. WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 13.
In contrast, collectives in the rural areas of the former Soviet Union were
as tightly controlled as state farms with no apparent practical differences. Lee,
supra note 88, at 203.
113. Adams, supra note 109, at 224.
114. Barry Naughton, Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization from
Below, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 266, 268 (1994). Regard for community and social con-
siderations, however, do not mean that TVEs are immune from either bankruptcy
or budget constraints or that TVEs are iron bowls and guarantee workers perma-
nent employment.
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TVEs are neither private nor state enterprises and cannot
easily fit into the traditional and binary classification of state
planning or free market.
TVEs, in fact, appear to be decentralized local states act-
ing in an entrepreneurial capacity. When the central govern-
ment eased barriers to entry into the light manufacturing
sector, various economic actors, including local governments,
stepped in to fill the economic void."5 These local govern-
ments vary in size and orientation but exhibit a common knack
for detecting new market opportunities and mobilizing resourc-
es to promote selected industries within their jurisdictional
zones. Some are large enough to encompass the entire popula-
tion of certain European countries," 6 most are subjected to
hard budget constraints and possess "limited access to
concessionary credits."' Thus, many "act more like diversi-
fied corporations, competing with other locales, than like sov-
ereign entities.""' Yet, despite their market orientation,
TVEs' collective ownership base also drives them "to take into
account community members' preferences in their decision
making .... [D]ecisions on the establishment of new TVEs
[are] often discussed and made collectively at village meet-ings.' '
The fact that such vaguely defined cooperatives have been
a driving force behind the country's economic growth has been
described as a paradox: an institution with a "vaguely defined
ownership and reward structure,"2 ' which has outperformed
the Eastern European model with its well defined bundles of
private property arrangements.
It has been summarily assumed that a full gambit of un-
ambiguous private property rights are essential for a market
economy.' Under this view, there must be a clear and exclu-
sive owner with the right to residual income which accrues in
the property, as well as the right to transform, lease or sell it.
Such private property rights are thought to be required be-
115. Naughton, supra note 74, at 53.
* 116. Id. at 65.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 46, at 16-17.
120. Id. at 3.
121. See, e.g., id. at 5-6.
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cause they provide owners with incentives to act as true own-
ers, to increase productivity and efficiency within the necessary
confines of hard budget constraints.'22
TVEs simply do not fit within the established rules which
a traditional property rights regime is supposed to entail. Be-
cause TVEs are collectives, the local community government,
not a private owner, exercises ownership rights. Yet, such
ownership rights are remarkable for what they omit rather
than what they include. They do not include the right to sell or
bequeath the TVE or its assets.'23 Moreover, collective mem-
bers, who are nominal owners, do not decide when or how
much benefits should be distributed, nor how to use such bene-
fits once they are distributed.'24 For example, approximately
60% of the after-tax profits of TVEs must be reinvested in a
reserve fund, a welfare fund, and a bonus fund and cannot be
distributed. In addition, even though collective members are
"owners," nominal ownership rights do not bestow on them the
automatic right to work in a TVE. 25 Similarly, even though
the local state is the "representative of all the 'owners,". 26 its
ownership rights do not give it the right to fire TVE workers
unless certain formal requirements are met.
Yet, despite the lack of private ownership rights and the
lack of full transfer, sale, or even use rights, TVEs have an
uncontested record of economic growth. In an effort to make
sense of this seemingly perplexing phenomenon, some econo-
mists have sought to impose a bright line conception of prop-
erty ownership on the TVEs by characterizing them as "pri-
vately-owned firms in disguise."'27 These private firms are
said to register as collective enterprises in order to receive
benefits accorded to collectives. However, regardless of how
these firms are formally registered, they are undeniably-in a
separate category from state and private enterprises as they
122. Id. at 6.
123. Id. at 12-13. The individual "owners" lose their ownership rights if they
leave the community.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id.
127. WEi & LIAN, supra note 48, at 14 ("'[Plrivate enterprises often registered
as collectively owned [i.e., TVEs], with full concurrence of local officials, allowing
the enterprises to gain access to bank credit and more favorable tax treatment.'")
(quoting source provided by the Asian Development Bank, 1993).
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exhibit a combination of market and collective-oriented behav-
iors.
Thus, the fact that China's transition from central owner-
ship to market-oriented behavior has been driven by a collec-
tive base with socially-founded property rights which are not
clearly defined should bring several privatization assumptions
into question. According to conventional Western prescriptions,
all entities with seemingly unclear property rights or multiple
owners with overlapping interests are considered economically
hazardous. Hence, the common Western indictment against
Eastern European collectives or workers' cooperatives may not
be universally accurate. 2 ' With such single-minded focus on
clear private property rights, it is no wonder that privatization
of state assets has been mandated.
First, the success of the TVEs reveals that wholesale reas-
signment of state property to private owners in order to clarify
property rights may be neither a cure-all nor a prerequisite for
all economies. Additionally, even in the West, it would be hard
to find so much lopsided faith invested in such reassignment
from public to private ownership alone. After all, even if great-
er productivity and efficiency is the economic raison d'etre of
private ownership, it is not merely tied to ownership, but also
to the perennial principal/agent problem of management and
regulation. Private property without market forces may simply
create private owners who perpetuate the patterns of ineffi-
cient and monopolistic behavior of their state predecessors.
Second, it is ironic that unrestricted and unambiguous
ownership rights are prescribed as imperatives for transitional
economies when such rights do not always exist in Western
economies themselves. Despite the indictment against "jumbled
and unclear" property rights and the deification of "unambigu-
ous individual rights needed for a successful market econo-
my," 29 even Western property regimes do not guarantee pri-
vate owners the unfettered right to use, destroy, develop,
transform, sell, or lease the property in question.
128. For a discussion of the necessity of worker ownership and control of for-
mer SOEs in Poland and the attendant conflicts which accompany it, see Robert
Wisner, A Socialist Shortcut to Capitalism? The Role of Worker Ownership in East-
ern Europe's Mass Privatizations, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 123, 138-46
(1993).
129. Christopher Clague, supra note 85, at ix.
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Nonetheless, the organizational structure of the TVEs
reveals a set of property arrangements which appear to be
much more perplexing than the typical Western property ar-
rangement. For example, the social base (land and productive
assets) which forms the foundation of the TVE, does not belong
to any one individual, but to the collective and cannot be sold.
If a TVE has been contracted to outside management, "all the
assets (including the incremental part contributed by the con-
tractor) are still owned by all the labor mass collectively."'
Third, the institution of private ownership rights, whether
clearly or poorly defined, is not always a necessary require-
ment to a well-functioning market. TVEs are collective enter-
prises under the ownership and nominal control of govern-
ments at the local township, provincial, and village level. Since
reform began in 1978, deregulation by the central government
has presented the local state with new opportunities to re-
spond in classically entrepreneurial ways. Thus, like entrepre-
neurs, local governments have invested resources in TVEs
poised to take advantage of new market niches. Local govern-
ments have also taken steps to facilitate the entry of new en-
terprises by: (1) allocating credit; (2) providing incentives; and
(3) harnessing the pattern and direction of economic growth,
while at the same time ensuring a minimum of state interfer-
ence in the management of such enterprises."' Therefore, the
local state retains an active role, with village and township
officials "reviewing all important plans and decisions regarding
expansion, investment, and product lines and playing very
active roles in marketing. In many respects, local officials in
rural areas have become entrepreneurs analogous to company
executives. 18 2
In this regard, the TVE experience has an additional im-
plication; a well-functioning market, efficient allocation of
resources, and economic productivity may very well coexist
with conditions inconsistent with the very logic of privatiza-
130. WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 46, at 11.
131. "[M]anagement is almost entirely independent of government." Cairncross
& Lin, supra note 26, at 13. Thus, despite the fact that TVEs are "half-private,
half-local government in ownership . . . their most important characteristic has
little to do with ownership. They are established by entrepreneurial initiative, not
by plan, and they have no assured support if they do not meet the test of the
marketplace." OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 67.
132. Walder, supra note 93, at 62.
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tion-the absence of private owners but the presence of very
active local states which show no signs of withdrawing. Addi-
tionally, such local states are embodiments of organizational
entities with wholly contradictory tendencies and mixed owner-
ship structures which are neither behaviorally nor structurally
capitalist in the strictest sense of the word. Thus, effective,
market-oriented reform is distinguishable from privatization as
currently implemented by the former Soviet bloc.
Fourth, wholesale state sector privatization may not be the
only way to remedy the problem of soft budget constraints.133
By downwardly reassigning use rights and income flows, from
government administration to collectives and then to house-
holds, China, through the contract responsibility system, was
able to alter the incentive structure without widespread and
rapid state sector privatization, decreasing the need for the
state to intervene with subsidies to keep an enterprise afloat.
In addition, even though collectively held assets are retained
by the collective, households are given the right to make man-
agement and marketing decisions regarding the assets in ex-
change for payments to the owners. As one commentator has
described the shift,
[i]n all of these downward transfers of use rights, the rela-
tionship between the principals (owners) and agents (their
subordinates) has been altered from one of hierarchical au-
thority, in which the principal, specifies in detail the duties
and methods of work of the agent, to one of contract, in
which the agent gains increased autonomy in carrying out
the assigned task in return for a contractually specified pay-
ment to the owners.'34
Economic growth in China has been generated primarily
by the newly emerging nonstate sector and its economic enti-
ties. Despite their nominally complementary status,"3 ' enter-
133. Originally coined by the Hungarian economist Janos Kornai, an enterprise
experiences soft budget constraints when no connection exists between its earnings
and its expenditures. Thus, even if expenditures chronically exceed earnings and
cause deficits, such deficits are resolved not by internal adjustments but by out-
side intervention. In centrally planned economies, the state usually steps in and
provides the needed subsidies, either with capital from the central bank or from
other money-making state enterprises, creating the additional problem of a never-
ending chain of interfirm debt. Milor, supra note 83, at 20 n.17.
134. Walder, supra note 93, at 57-58.
135. For example, the Constitution was revised in 1988 to reaffirm the state's
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prises outside the state sector have proliferated to such an
extent that they have overtaken firms inside the state sector.
According to the Asian Development Bank's 1994 Asian Devel-
opment Report, state firms, which still produce half of China's
total industrial output, grew by a mere 6.4%. In contrast, the
outputs of TVEs grew by over 40%, and private enterprises
and foreign joint-venture enterprises grew by more than
45%. 136
While this separate sector of new firms has provided the
engine for growth and contributed to the emergence of a more
market-oriented culture and environment, 1 7 the state sector
has not necessarily benefitted from the surge of nonstate
growth. The state sector has remained essentially unaltered,
not just as the canonical foundation of "socialism with Chinese
characteristics," but as a statistical albatross on the Chinese
state. Indeed, after years of reform, the state sector still con-
sists of over 100,000 state enterprises which employ 75% of
China's urban labor force of approximately 108 million work-
ers. Additionally, in September 1994, 44.5% of state owned
enterprises were losing money, with total losses climbing to
commitment to a system of public ownership supplemented by an ancillary sector
consisting of individual and private economies. "The state permits the private
sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law.
The private sector of the economy is a complement to the socialist public econo-
my." ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution] [XIANFA (1982)] art. 11.
Under China's system of classification, there are two categories of private
businesses. First, there are private individual businesses, which are driven by
single-household labor and hire less than eight employees. Second, there are pri-
vate businesses which hire more than eight employees. This group is also called
"private capitalistic businesses" and is considered exploitative in nature. See Lee,
supra note 88, at 191.
136. Isberto, supra note 48.
A sample of 434 Chinese cities showed significant differences between the
performances of state and nonstate firms. Nonstate firms grew at a faster rate
than state firms. Moreover, the shares in output7 for state firms declined from
78.1% in 1988 to 73.3% in 1990. Meanwhile, the shares in output for nonstate
firms increased over the same period, with TVEs gaining an increase of five per-
centage points. See WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 15.
137. China's strategy of creating an increasingly market-oriented environment
also included the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs), economic labora-
tories, in other words, for the experimentation with trade and investment between
Chinese and foreign investors. SEZs were more than export processing zones and
were in fact intended to be "windows and bridges," windows through which the
outside world could view the Chinese economy, and vice versa, and bridges over
which Chinese and foreign enterprises could cross. Wall & Fukasaku, supra note
84, at 157.
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over 29 billion yuan.138
IV. REFORMING THE STATE SECTOR
This part examines efforts taken towards the transforma-
tion of the state sector. The first section explores various mea-
sures adopted by the government to expose state sector enter-
prises to market disciplines and to reorient state sector behav-
ior in the absence of state sector privatization. The second
section studies the current phase of Chinese state sector pri-
vatization. It examines the recent securitization of Chinese
state enterprises and assesses the ideological and regulatory
framework adopted by the government to control and limit
state sector privatization.
A. Enterprise Reform without State Sector Privatization
"It takes more than one cold day
for a river to freeze three feet deep."139
In general, it has been said that "the important distinction
is not public versus private-it is monopoly versus competi-
138. Xiao Yu, Backing for State Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 7, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
In 1992, a full one-third of China's state enterprises were insolvent, another
one-third suspected of heavy losses, and only one-third could be considered profit-
able. Gong, supra note 7, at 34. Also in 1992, $7.82 billion of China's 1992 state
expenditures were used as subsidies to cover losses, an amount which did not
include "soft loans" made with little expectations of repayment by state banks. Id.
For an understanding of the sheer size and magnitude of China's economy
and the complexity of reforming such a vast number of enterprises, see David
Bachman, China and Privatization, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR
REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION 275 (Ezra Suleiman & John Waterbury eds., 1990). As
of 1985, there were approximately 463,000 urban industrial enterprises, 94,000
state-owned factories, 368,000 collective enterprises, 1,570,000 rural collective in-
dustrial enterprises, and more than 10,000,000 private rural enterprises. Also there
were 25,000,000 commercial enterprises, of which 4,000,000 were state enterprises,
9,000,000 were collective enterprises and 12,000,000 were individual enterprises.
All have undergone some type of reform. In contrast, Hungarian economic reform
involved only about 700 enterprises. Id. at 278.
139. "Exclusive Extracts" from Wu Bangguo Speech at Economic Meeting, British
Broadcasting Corp. Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 30, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, TBBCSW File [hereinafter Bangguo Speech]. "The reform of
state-owned enterprises is a long-term task. The goal in terms of timing raised by
the central economic work conference is to properly solve the problems of state-
owned enterprises by the end of this century. The reason is quite obvious: 'It
takes more than one cold day for a river to freeze three feet deep.'" Id.
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tion."'4 ° Under this theory, a simple transfer of ownership
from public to private interests will not increase efficiency.
Managerial responsibility and accountability to the public
interest must be introduced through a complementary system
of competition from other providers, and compensation and
incentives based on performance measurements.' Essential-
ly, at the core of Chinese reform is the eventual separation of
state and private enterprise. That is, a separation of the
government's economic management function from its role as
the custodian of state assets.'
It has been precisely within the parameters of this theoret-
ical umbrella that China first attempted to revamp its state
sector. In 1991, the Party's reformist ideology re-emerged after
Tiananmen and reasserted Deng Xiaoping's economic agenda,
which places fundamental reforms of medium and large state
enterprises at the forefront. The changes approved by the
Communist Party's 14th Congress included bold measures for
managerial reform in accordance with the 'law of the fittest,"
management with neither state interference nor state
assistance,'4 designed to force the state sector to "emulate
the more dynamic collective and private sectors through com-
petition at home and in the international economy."
45
Most recently, the Chinese government has identified state
owned enterprise reform as the major task of economic restruc-
140. John B. Goodman & Gary W. Loveman, Does Privatization Serve the Pub-
lic Interest?, HARv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1991, 26, 28. In what the authors term
an attempt to move the privatization debate from "the ideological ground of pri-
vate versus public to the more pragmatic ground of managerial behavior and ac-
countability," the focus becomes simply "good management-regardless of owner-
ship." Id. at 28.
141. Id.
142. Yu, supra note 138.
143. Miller, supra note 22, at 24. The emergence of a nonstate sector means
that "more than two-thirds of current economic activity takes place outside the
State system." Id. at 28-29. However, "the remaining third," the inefficient state
enterprises, still has to be reformed. This is a difficult task considering the size of
some of the enterprises. For example, some steel or coal companies have more
than 100,000 employees. OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 62.
144. Miller, supra note 22, at 29.
145. Id. at 31. Other modes of reform include mergers. In the 1980s, almost
7000 enterprises were merged and approximately 4000 enterprises came out of the
red, reducing the level of losses by 522 million yuan. Speeding Up Reform with
Regard to Property Rights, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Mar. 14, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA File.
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turing in 1995. China's President, Jian Zemin identified the
"three keys" required to successfully open up China's economy,
each of which is dependent on and intimately connected to the
success of state sector reform. Thus,
the key to building socialism with Chinese characteristics lies
in successfully running large and medium state owned enter-
prises; the key to accelerating the establishment of a socialist
market economic system lies in making substantive progress
in the reform of large and medium state owned enterprises;
and the key to gaining a favourable position for fierce inter-
national economic competition in the 21st century lies in
comprehensively enhancing the competitiveness of large and
medium state owned enterprises. 4'
The gradual shift towards market-oriented reform in other
spheres of the economy has had a percolating effect on the
behavior and performance of the state sector. No longer are
state enterprises automatically immune from the effects of
market forces. State enterprises must now cope with market
competition rather than simply navigating the bureaucratic
channels for their survival. No longer can they concentrate
solely on satisfying the central plan's targets at the expense of
the needs of their customers. TVEs and other nonstate enter-
prises "have seeped into all the nooks and crannies of busi-
nesses formerly under the monopoly control of state enterpris-
es, like salt water infiltrating cement and gradually breaking
it up."147
Thus, the environment in which state enterprises dwell is
no longer completely centralized and monolithic. Competition
from the outside has forced state enterprises to be competitive
from within as well. Hence, a steady, though insufficient, in-
crease in" state sector productivity and competitiveness has
occurred.'48
146. Bangguo Speech, supra note 139.
147. OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 67.
148. Even China's largest tractor manufacturer, for example, had to experiment
with new ways to increase its market share. It has tried "'to improve the quality
of its products as well as its marketing and publicity techniques in a bid to off-
set . . . sluggish domestic sales . . . . The Luoyang tractor complex had been
forced to sacrifice more than half of its profits in trying discounts, lotteries and
free delivery of goods to boost sales.'" Thomas G. Rawski, Progress Without Pri-
vatization: The Reform of China's State Industries, in-CHANGING POLITICAL ECONO-
MIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST STATES 39
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Aside from exposing state enterprises to increased compe-
tition from the nonstate sector, the government also added a
second ingredient for reform: private initiatives and manageri-
al compensation based on performance instituted under a sys-
tem essentially similar to the agricultural responsibility con-
tract system.149 Responsibility contracts have been utilized by
parties at all levels of the production and distribution chain:
"between the state and enterprises.., between central and
local authorities, between localities, between local authorities
at various levels and between an enterprise and its staff and
workers." 50
Under the managerial responsibility system, managers are
given greater autonomy and responsibility over the "microeco-
nomic" details of the enterprise. Thus, consistent with reforms
begun during the late 1970s and early 1980s designed to in-
crease enterprise autonomy, managers are granted greater
power to decide such things as what to produce, where to buy
supplies, how to market the products, and how large the work
force should be.15' Reforms initiated include profit sharing
plans, bonus plans tied to managerial or enterprise perfor-
mance, and the legalization of price flexibility based on supply
and demand.
Enterprise and state can also enter into contracts stipulat-
ing the amount of tax and profit the enterprise is required to
turn over to the state.'52 Once the performance goals of the
enterprise have been met, the enterprise is allowed to retain
excess profits which may be used however its management
(Vedat Milor ed., 1994) (quoting Anming Gao, Giant Tractor Maker Plagued by
Slow Sales, CHINA DAILY, May 28, 1991, at 4).
149. The major laws on reform of state enterprise management include, among
others, the following- Law of the People's Republic of China on Industrial Enter-
prises Owned by the Whole People, Apr. 13, 1988, China Laws for Foreign Busi-
ness, 2 Business Regulation (CCH) 13-534 (1989); and, Provisional Regulations
for State-Owned Industrial Enterprises, Apr. 1, 1983, China Laws for Foreign
Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH) % 13-500 (1989).
150. Observe Economic Laws, Speed Up Four Modernizations, Xinhua General
Overseas News Service, Oct. 16, 1978, available in LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA
File.
151. Bachman, supra note 138, at 279.
152. Id. The system based on managerial incentives has also been called "man-
agement targets responsibility," in which enterprise managers and the state would
enter into a contract enumerating certain targets to be met by managers within a
specified period of time. Qian, supra note 91, at 73.
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deems desirable. In addition, workers within the enterprise are
granted an incentive bonus if they exceed the performance
commitments contracted with management.15 Both enter-
prises and workers are granted a portion of the enterprises'
income rights in the form of profit retention for enterprises
and bonuses for workers.
Therefore, even within the parameters of state ownership,
China instituted property rights reform by assigning use rights
downward from the central plan towards more enterprise au-
tonomy. The downward transfer of use rights (the right to use
the enterprise and its assets) was also accompanied by the
parallel transfer of the right to retain profits. 15 4 By adopting
profit contracting arrangements and by shifting from requiring
enterprises to remit profits to simply requiring them to pay
taxes, state enterprises have been allowed to retain a larger
proportion of their profits to be disposed of at the discretion of
the enterprise managers.155
Transfers of property rights have in turn led to other
forms of unofficial assignments. An example of these assign-
ments is the system of informal subcontracting and leasing ar-
rangements which have, in effect, created a "'secondary
market' in use and income rights over productive assets."15
Such secondary markets have allowed state enterprises to
lease the right to use land, offices, buildings, and vehicles to
entrepreneurs, thereby maximizing their budgets through such
informal arrangements.'57
In addition to separating ownership and management to
153. Bersani, supra note 6, at 306; see also Hilary Joseph, Labor Reform in the
Workers' State: The Chinese Experience, 2 J. CHINESE L. 201, 206 (1988).
Other arrangements designed to boost production through a system of pri-
vate initiatives include arrangements allowing managers to bid for the right to
manage certain enterprises. Potential managers enter a bidding process and the
successful bidder contracts with the state to generate a set amount of profit over
a fixed period of time. The manager awarded the "lease management rights" is
allowed to retain all profits minus the amount previously committed. Bachman,
supra note 138, at 279-80. For example, in the seaport town of Qingdao,
reformists have disposed of near-bankrupt businesses by allowing local entrepre-
neurs to take over everything under the "state ownership, private management"
arrangement. Pete Engardio, Capitalism Seeps Into an Old Port, Bus. WEEK (Int'l
Ed.), June 13, 1994, at 4.
154. See Walder, supra note 93, at 58.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 59.
157. Id.
148 [Vol. MX:I1
THE CHINESE MODEL
increase enterprise efficiency and productivity,"'8 China also
spearheaded an additional series of reforms designed to create
a dual track pricing system consisting of dual prices within the
state sector itself. Thus, there are two prices for each commodi-
ty, one price set by the state in accordance with its plan, and
the other set by the market in accordance with the law of sup-
ply and demand. While state owned enterprises must still meet
their compulsory quota within the plan and must still sell their
products to the state at a typically lower, state-assigned price,
any surplus generated above the state's quota becomes market
products to be sold at market price. As more commodities are
released from the auspices of the plan, more enterprises are
seeking new ways to take advantage of these more profitable
opportunities, thus eroding the centrality of the plan. Contrast
this strategy of gradual price reform with the conventional
Western prescription for "Big Bang" price adjustment which
requires an immediate shift from controlled prices to market
prices.
This two-tier pricing system for state sector goods accom-
plished two purposes. First, it introduced state sector enter-
prises to the basic concept of the market and, when combined
with the system of managerial incentives described above, it
encouraged them to adopt certain conceptual as well as con-
crete changes in behavior. For instance, it encourages these
firms to operate at market prices and to think in terms of
greater productivity and efficiency. Second, it allowed state
sector enterprises to interact and transact with nonstate sector
enterprises, and these transactions "developed into a remark-
able variety of forms.""9 State sector and nonstate sector
trade, whether in the form of various cooperative arrange-
ments or joint ventures, increased, as profit-minded state sec-
tor enterprises sought to economize by subcontracting with
more efficient nonstate rural businesses. 60
158. In a command economy such as China's, the state owns and manages the
enterprise. By contrast, an American corporation generally divorces management
from ownership so that the owners (shareholders) are not the same as the manag-
ers who run the enterprise on a daily basis. China has sought to build a "Chinese
wall" between ownership and management without losing ownership control.
159. Naughton, supra note 74, at 53.
160. Id. However, private sector firms should not be allowed to make excess
profits by purchasing goods at below market price from state firms and selling
them to the public at market price. The misuse of the dual price system by inter-
1995] 149
BROOK. J. INTL L.
By increasing the competitive pressures exerted on state
enterprises and by implementing other measures designed to
improve enterprise performance, the move towards enterprise
reform has led to some positive results. For example, basic
data on state and collective industry compiled from 1978 to
1988 revealed that the gross output value of state owned enter-
prises increased from 342.1 billion yuan in 1978 to 1.35 trillion
yuan in 1988.161 Other data also revealed sustained improve-
ments in at least several measures of productivity. For in-
stance, the total factor of productivity in state owned industry
during the 1980s increased at an annual average of 2.4%, not
as rapidly as the TVE sector, which improved at a rate of 4.6%,
but an increase nonetheless.'62
While the reforms described above have clearly created
palpable changes in the environment in which state enterpris-
es operate and hence changes in the behavior of state enter-
prises, they appear to be inadequate mechanisms in and of
themselves unless adopted in conjunction with some state
sector privatization. Although it appears that state enterprises
have experienced increased productivity, the generous profit
retention schemes expended towards worker bonuses, worker
housing construction projects, and other enterprise funds have
resulted in a decrease in enterprise profits remitted to the
state."'63 The resulting increase in the accumulation of con-
sumption funds, which exerted inflationary pressure on the
economy,"6 the concomitant reduction of state revenues, and
the increase in state subsidies to inefficient enterprises have
forced the state to find ways to raise money and at the same
time curb inflation. The continued inability of the state sector
to support itself-20% of China's annual revenues had to be
pumped into the more than 60% of the state owned enterprises
that continued to lose money --meant that the government
mediaries and the popular resentment generated may have contributed to the
Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Clague, supra note 85, at 8 n.2.
161. Rawski, supra note 148, at 30. But see Lee, supra note 88, at 194 (in-
creases in profit retention schemes and managerial autonomy have not resulted in
significant increases in economic efficiency and productivity).
162. Walder, supra note 93, at 60.
163. Lee, supra note 88, at 194.
164. Id.
165. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 728. Some economists, however, have
come to a different conclusion. While acknowledging 1989 data showing state sec-
tor losses, they nonetheless point to the fact that such mounting losses came pri-
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truly had no choice but to move the experiment from a simple
contract system with limited marketization to a more ideologi-
cally complex shareholding system. That is, to a system of
decentralized ownership and multiple shareholders.
However, in keeping with past practices, extensive prepa-
ratory work had to be done along ideologically meticulous lines
so that radical experimentation could be safely channelled into
harmony and conformity with socialist theory. Thus, divesting
the state of its ownership interest in state owned enterprises
could not be called privatization in China. As Liu Hongru, Vice
Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring the Eco-
nomic System, declared, "What we resolutely oppose is privat-
ization. But we do not because of that oppose a stockholding
system."66
B. Privatizing the State Sector
"Are such things as securities and stock markets good or
bad?... Can they only exist under capitalism? Cannot they
also be adapted to socialism?"
167
While there is a mandate for mass and rapid privatization
of state sector enterprises in Eastern Europe, no such mandate
exists in China. Thus, the securitization of state enterprises
and the establishment of a securities market presented China
with one of its most controversial ideological issues to date: the
conversion of state enterprises into a joint stock or
shareholding system and the subsequent ownership of equity
in such enterprises by private participants. After years of try-
ing to revive the state sector through a series of half-hearted
measures, China has finally begun to allow outside equity
interest in state enterprises. However, as will be demonstrated
marily from two sectors-coal mining and petroleum extraction-due primarily to
artificially low prices administered by the state. See Rawski, supra note 148, at
38. Additionally, other losses occurred in defense industries and were caused by
declining demand resulting from the easing of tension between China and its
neighbors. Thus, about two-thirds of 1989 losses could be traced back to causes
which were unrelated to state sector inefficiency. Id. at 38-39.
166. Qian, supra note 91, at 83.
167. Speech made by Deng Xiaoping on his visit to one of China's most eco-
nomically thriving zones, Shenzhen Economic Zone in Guangdong Province, quoted
in Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 729.
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below, the ideological framework currently in place, designed
to accommodate both market and socialism, reflects not just
the quandaries of its two genetically mixed origins but also the
hiccups of political deadlock and compromise.
The following sections examine Chinese state sector pri-
vatization. In particular, focus will be placed on the motiva-
tions underlying the government's decision to securitize its
state enterprises and on its marked preference for securitizing
such enterprises through debt rather than equity. The recent
creation of the securities exchanges and the ideological under-
currents which have shaped and defined the Chinese securities
market will then be discussed. Particular emphasis will be
paid to the government's preference for issuing debt instead of
equity, the government's desire to engage in only limited state
sector privatization, and the government's insistence on retain-
ing its paramount interests as majority shareholder.
1. Motivations and Historical Developments
There are two overriding motivations underlying China's
move towards a securities system: the inability of traditional
sources of financing to meet the capital requirements of insol-
vent state enterprises... and the desire of the state to tap in-
to a pool of private capital outside direct state control. In this
latter respect, the Chinese model of privatization has produced
a distinctively Chinese reality-state sector privatization moti-
vated by the surplus, not the dearth of domestic capital. This
fact makes the free distribution schemes adopted in Eastern
Europe economically unnecessary.
The Chinese government has shown remarkable dexterity
in its capital fundraising endeavor. It has converted state busi-
nesses into shareholder enterprises and allowed shares of se-
lect enterprises to be traded on the stock exchange. In this
way, the government was able to raise funds without direct
foreign credits or direct foreign investment in either joint ven-
tures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises.'69 By establishing
168. There are four main sources of financing for state enterprises: (1) fiscal
appropriations; (2) funds generated by the enterprises themselves, including profits
and depreciation expenses; (3) bank loans; and (4) debt and equity issuances. Qian,
supra note 91, at 66 n.11.
169. See Jia Zhao & Li Qian, Trading Stocks in China: Development, Regula-
tion, Issues and Prospects, E. ASIAN ExEcUTivE REP., June 15, 1992, at 7, 8. "Be-
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a securities market, the government was able to create a
unique opportunity to raise capital and, at the same time,
draw into its sphere of control a wealth of private resources
previously hidden outside the state's reach, namely a surplus
of savings under almost one billion Chinese mattresses.
The prosperity and proliferation of the nonstate sector has
meant that China's citizens have been able to save large
amounts of money.' ° With one of the highest saving rates in
the world (30%)," ' private surplus capital amounted to an
under-utilized pool of approximately 1.3 trillion yuan ($260
billion).' 2 This pool of private capital was either hidden un-
der mattresses or tied up in low-yield bonds or low-interest
savings accounts.' 3 The amount of private savings is even
cause of the government's policy of encouraging foreign investors, enterprises that
could not themselves get loans from banks for the purpose of expanding production
capacity were given an opportunity to obtain financing if they entered into joint
ventures with foreign investors. With the general shortage of financing, however,
Chinese companies found that entering into a joint venture did not necessarily
guarantee bank loans." Id.
170. The problem confronting Eastern Europe and Russia is almost the reverse.
While an enormous pool of private capital in China has been created both to the
dismay and joy of the government, the opposite has occurred in the former East-
ern bloc. Because of a scarcity of domestic capital, privatization in Eastern Europe
has indeed taken a markedly different route. For example, an outright purchase of
shares by Polish citizens of privatized enterprises had to be ruled out because
even "under the very optimistic assumption that people are prepared to spend 20-
30% of all their savings to buy shares in the privatized enterprises, the amount of
money available for the purchase of the state companies would equal between
2.4% and 3.6% of their book value." FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 14, at
22. A distribution program of free vouchers, therefore, would "eliminate the prob-
lem of capital" as well as "legitimacy problems associated with selective give-
aways." Id. at 27.
171. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 730. Other sources have estimated an
even higher savings rate of 39%. See, e.g., Money and Banking: 11.4 Securities and
Bond Markets, CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library,
CHINAH File. Despite its high savings rate, "[slaving remains an unattractive
prospect because the bank interest rates are typically low (often lower than the
rate of inflation)." Id.; see also China, EUROMONEY: HANDBOOK OF WORLD ECONO-
MIES AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES, Sept. 1992, at 121, 124 (Supp.). Analysts
estimate that as much as $200 billion sits idle in the domestic banking system,
while up to $100 billion is concealed outside the system by individuals distrustful
of banks. Household savings in China provides approximately 70% of funds used
to finance new investment. Guardiano, supra note 1.
172. Others have estimated that the private savings in China have amounted
to $310 billion. Business Briefing: China, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 1, 1993, at 83,
available in Westlaw, Far Eastern Economic Review Database.
173. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 730.
The financial system remains primitive but is slowly improving. Despite a
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more astonishing when compared to the value of state held
assets, which totalled approximately $240 billion. 17 4
With $41 billion worth of foreign debt'75 and its state en-
terprises chronically running at a deficit, China's securities
exchange system was undoubtedly motivated by the desire to
utilize private capital to finance public debt.'76 The availabil-
ity of domestic private capital allowed China to avoid Eastern
Europe's problem of finding domestic buyers for state assets.
By contrast, Russia and certain Eastern European countries
such as Poland have had to resort to the free distribution of
vouchers,"17 thus foregoing the possibility of raising funds for
insolvent enterprises through the privatization process itself.
China, on the other hand, had no difficulty locating domestic
capital. In fact, the very existence of such a vast source of pri-
vate capital beyond the state's control may have been one of
the primary motivations behind China's decision to institute
state sector privatization.
The development of a shareholding system and a stock
exchange was also motivated by the concern that a surplus
accumulation of savings would overheat the economy. In short,
too much money could create high inflation if used to chase too
few consumer goods. 7' In this respect, China's attempt to di-
large disposable pool of savings, investment opportunities remain limited. These
opportunities are, however, rapidly expanding. At the end of 1993, the combined
value of all securities outstanding in China had a value of 750 billion yuan, of
which 544 billion are debt securities. (The exchange rate, as of March 1, 1994, is
$1 equals 8.7 yuan.). Yu Zhang, China's Emerging Securities Markets, 29 COLUM.
J. WORLD Bus. 113 (1994).
174. Business Briefing: China, supra note 172, at 83.
175. Juliet Sychrava, China: Marches to a Changing Tune, EUROMONEY, Aug.
13, 1990, at 47, 48. Another estimate puts the foreign debt at the highest avail-
able figure of $67 billion at the end of 1991. See OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 56.
176. As Jing Shuping, one of the first proponents of a shareholding system and
a permanent director of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation
has unabashedly explained, a shareholding system can do the following: "First, it
can turn some of the consumption fund into production fund and promote the
development of production .... Second, it is a new way to absorb foreign capi-
tal .... Third, it helps enterprises to restrain themselves and makes them im-
prove efficiency and develop healthily.'" Qian, supra note 91, at 83.
A share system also allows the government another way of raising money
besides "forcing state factories to buy government treasury notes through compul-
sory wage deductions." Peter Goodspeed, 'Capitalist Oppression' Is Back as
Shanghai Market Re-Opens, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 16, 1990, at F1, available in
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, TSTAR File.
177. Gordon, supra note 43, at 522-23.
178. Paul Schroeder, Rebuilding China's Securities Markets, CHINA BUS. REV.,
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vert surplus capital away from either idle savings or overheat-
ed inflationary spending has been quite successful.'79 It has
not only presented the government with a strategy for averting
inflation, but has also given the government an opportunity for
using domestic resources, rather than relying exclusively on
foreign capital, to generate economic growth.
Like its other market-oriented measures, China's conver-
sion of inert domestic savings into investment capital had to be
accomplished within the specific parameters of market social-
ism. Just as the private sector could only supplement the more
dominant public economy, so too must private capital be con-
tained. Thus, as more fully discussed below, any equity the
state extracts from Chinese personal savings could only be
channelled, at the early stages of the securitization experi-
ment, into debt instruments which do not implicate socialist
ownership of the means of production; and currently, into lim-
ited minority interests in state enterprises. 80
As the Deputy Director of the State Commission for Re-
structuring the Economy, Liu Hongru, boldly announced, 'We
May-June 1991, at 20, 21 ("A capital market could also assist further experiments
in price reform by easing inflationary pressures, as money would be steered to-
ward investment rather than consumer spending."). A shareholding system has
been assigned a multitude of functions. Shares can be used to raise capital for fi-
nancing purposes by coaxing private savings into an arena susceptible to the con-
trol of the state. They can also be used to solve China's "two contradictory eco-
nomic imperatives. One is slowing an overheated economy. The other is seizing
perceived historical opportunities for accelerated development." Gong, supra note 7,
at 36.
179. As the head of a consulting company remarked: "The most important sign
of China's economic development in the 1990's is that savings have started to
come out into the market.'" Sheila Tefft, Shanghai: Boom Town of the East, CHRIS-
TIAN Sci. MONITOR, Dec. 31, 1993, at 6.
180. Everywhere in China it seems, scholars and practitioners strain to reiter-
ate the idea of private equity shareholding within the context of public ownership.
One scholar made the distinction that "changes in the forms of realization of pub-
lic ownership" will not undermine "the essence of public ownership," Qian, supra
note 91, at 81 n.74, since a shareholding system is only a product of the socializa-
tion of the means of production and not an inherent product of capitalism:
'The shareholding system has emerged under the capitalist system but it
is not the exclusive right of capitalism. Rather, it is the product of the
socialization and commercialization of production. It may exist under the
capitalist system but it can also exist under the socialist system and
serve socialism.'
Qian, supra note 91, at 82 (quoting Xiao Zuoji, Shixin Shehui Zhuyi Gongyouzhi
De Xinshi [On the Forms of Realizing Socialist Ownership], 2 JINGJI YANJIU 38
(1992)).
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are a socialist country, and we must hold fast to public owner-
ship of assets, and to the principle of combining a market econ-
omy and a planned economy. Under these conditions we will
create securities markets."18'
2. The Initial Securitization of State Sector Firms:
Equity Subdued
The securitization of Chinese state enterprises occurred in
two phases. The first phase was marked by a sharp preference
for the issuance of debt over equity. The second phase was
marked by the mandate for majority state interests in the
privatized enterprises.
Initially, China's experiments with securities were strictly
limited to the issuance of internal bonds in the form of
workers' bonus shares. Unlike the first phase of reform, where
sound economic reasons existed for the strategy of retaining
the state sector while creating a new nonstate sector, the path
of state sector securitization currently pursued by the govern-
ment is much less the product of rational economic policy than
political impasse.
In an ideologically inoffensive move designed to make
socialist "worker ownership" compatible with individual in-
centives and profits, enterprises were allowed to issue incen-
tive shares to their own employees.182 It was hoped that by
tying employee compensation to economic performance through
employee equity participation in the enterprise, employees
would have greater incentives to make the enterprise more
profitable. In the early 1980s, however, as enterprises became
insolvent, incentive shares originally intended to boost worker
morale transmogrified into compulsory bonds forced onto em-
ployees by money-losing enterprises as a substitute for mone-
tary compensation." 3 Sometimes as much as 10% of an
181. Sychrava, supra note 175, at 48.
182. As one worker in the state-run People's Bank of China said, "We feel a
stock market will not affect socialism. Most of our shareholders will be workers.
There is no contradiction." Goodspeed, supra note 176, at Fl.
183. See Zhao & Qian, supra note 169, at 8. Once it was discovered that non-
negotiable debentures were routinely forced by financially shaky enterprises upon
staff members and workers, the State Council, on March 5, 1989, issued a direc-
tive requiring that "internal debenture subscriptions be on a voluntary basis and
only for short-term working capital needs." Id.
When faced with the prospect of capital shortages, Beijing, however, has not
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employee's salary had to be taken in bonds." 4
Despite its inauspicious beginnings, the introduction of
bonds into the economy presented the government with a
much-needed opportunity. Bonds represented a noncontrover-
sial financing tool, providing the Chinese government with an
ideologically compatible vehicle for raising needed capital. Debt
instruments wholly void of equity interests allowed the govern-
ment to raise money without implicating socialist ownership of
the means of production and without undermining government
control of state enterprises.' In its initial stages, China's
regulatory regime has exhibited a pronounced preference for
the use of debt over equity as a financing tool." 6 Indeed,
hesitated to engage in compulsory sales. When it was discovered in May of 1993
that only 15% of 30 billion renminbi worth of treasury bonds issued by the gov-
ernment had been subscribed, Beijing warned the provinces and cities that unless
they buy their quota of the entire issuance, they would be barred from listing
their stocks on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Beijing also warned that
workers would be forced to buy all government bonds that had failed to sell. By
August, more than 37 billion renminbi worth of treasury bonds were sold. Money
and Banking: 11.4-Investing in B-Shares, CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 1993, available in
LEXIS, WORLD Library, CHINAH File.
184. Sychrava, supra note 175, at 50. Nevertheless, the fixed returns on these
internal debt instruments, which are nonnegotiable and carry no promises of own-
ership, did not help create employee incentives. Even when instruments deemed
shares were distributed to employees, they resembled bonds more than stocks.
They were "redeemable at specified maturity dates, could be called by the enter-
prise, and did not provide the holder with any voting rights." Bersani, supra note
6, at 307 n.12.
185. See OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 151-56 for an account of the development
of the bond market in China. Fiscal tightening by the government in the mid-
1980s forced enterprises to issue bonds as a way of subsidizing their own capital
shortages. Although bonds carry no ownership rights and thus do not endanger
socialist notions of ownership, Beijing's issuance of treasury bills in 1981 to fi-
nance its modernization drive did constitute a "break with Maoist economic theory,
which categorically rejected any form of national debt." Schell & Lappin, supra
note 7, at 728.
Other types of financing followed and by the end of the 1980s, "the forms
of state-issued bonds had proliferated: they included government bonds, treasury
bonds, special project bonds, and value-guaranteed bonds with interest rates in-
dexed to inflation." OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 152. The public's need to trade in
bonds led to the emergence in 1988 of secondary market trading. Experimenting
markets initially appeared in seven big cities and later, in 54 cities. Id. By De-
cember 1990, a nation-wide, computerized bond-trading network, the Securities
Trading Automated Quotations Systems (STAQS) (with the capacity to expand to
include stocks) was opened. Id. at 155. The presence of a bond market also helped
curb inflation by absorbing excess money that could have flooded the consumer
market. Id. at 156.
186. For an account of China's discriminatory treatment against stocks, see
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from 1981 to 1988, bonds alone were the driving force behind
the securities industry.'87
Soon after bonds were introduced and successfully used in
China as a fundraising tool by the government, in 1984 the
World Bank proposed a shareholding system in which it recom-
mended that "the enterprises' assets ... be divided into shares
and owned by several government departments."8 ' Although
the "original single ownership system"'89 would eventually be
dispersed into a "multi ownership system,"190 under this pro-
posal, equity interests in a state enterprise would still be held
by other state-controlled enterprises with enough excess capi-
tal for investment. Enterprises would be converted into
shareholding companies, with their shares held by other state
enterprises.
Even though China's securities legislation has evolved far
beyond the prescriptions by the World Bank, and despite Chi-
nese regulations which permit private equity ownership, ma-
jority state ownership has continued to dominate China's secu-
Pitman Potter, Shanghai Securities Regulations, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Aug.
15, 1991, at 7, 7. According to Professor Potter, Shanghai's regime is designed to
restrict private enterprises' access to capital. "In light of the provisions of central
government bond regulations restricting the capacity of private enterprises to issue
bonds, these entities must rely heavily on stock issues to raise capital. The more
stringent controls on stock issues indicate an effort to restrict the ability of private
enterprises to compete against bond-funded state projects for investor capital." Id.
at 8 (citation omitted). Requirements for stock issuances are designed to be more
onerous than those for state bond issuers because bond issuers are generally limit-
ed to government entities and state banks while stock issuers are generally en-
terprises of all kinds, including private enterprises.
187. Qian, supra note 91, at 66 n.15.
In December 1991, it was reported that of the 200 billion yuan in securities
issued to date, over 80% were in the form of bonds. Automated Quotation System
Helps Securities Trading in China, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Service, Dec. 6,
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA File. As part of the campaign
to elevate bonds above stocks and to curb the growth of stocks, the state council,
on March 28, 1987, promulgated a notice which declared that: (1) stocks may be
issued only by a small number of approved collective enterprises; (2) state enter-
prises may not issue stock. Conversely, state enterprises may issue bonds and
other debt securities. Zhao & Qian, supra note 169, at 8. Clearly, these measures
were motivated by no reason other than the desire by the state to remain the sole
owner of state enterprises.
The first stock issued by a state enterprise occurred in 1986 when the
state-owned Shenyang Jinbei (Gold Cup) Auto Industrial Shareholding Corporation
reorganized as a shareholding company. Id.
188. Qian, supra note 91, at 75.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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rities market.'9 ' While the urgent need to raise additional
capital forced China to experiment with a shareholding system
"that would transfer portions of state owned enterprises to
individuals or organizations below the central level,"'92 the
experimentation has been extremely constricted and distorted
because it had to be conducted within a regulatory framework
that reformers could defend as complementary to socialist
ideology.
3. China's Securities Exchanges:
The Emerging Regulatory Framework 9 .
Although the creation of a shareholding system and securi-
ties market reflects an ideological willingness to experiment
with ownership reform, the experiment has been hampered by
the Party's insistence that majority state ownership remain
the irreducible core of all reforms. In an effort to keep intact
what it considers to be the residual values of social ownership
of the means of production, the Chinese government has re-
fused to relinquish majority state ownership. A shareholding
system with the state as majority shareholder allows the state
to divorce itself from the management operations of the enter-
prise (a step in the same direction as prior attempts towards
enterprise reform discussed above).. without risking the loss
of control.
This section investigates the development of the Chinese
stock market and China's manipulation of its shareholding
system to privatize as a means of state-directed development.
Although Chinese enterprises had been issuing shares to em-
191. Of all the shares issued on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, approximately
70% were in the hands of state or state-controlled enterprises. Ann S. Tyson,
China Restricts Shanghai Stock Exchange, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 3, 1991,
at 7.
192. Schroeder, supra note 178, at 21.
193. It is not the purpose of this article to study China's securities or company
legislation. For an excellent examination of the former, see Qian, supra note 91, at
85-97. For an excellent examination of the latter, see Bersani, supra note 6, at
307-28.
194. The separation of the state as owner of a state enterprise from its role as
manager of the enterprise has been approved at the recent National People's Con-
gress, which adopted a constitutional amendment designating state enterprises as
"state owned" rather than "state run." See Bersani, supra note 6, at 304-05 n.6;
see also Preston Torbert, China's Evolving Company Legislation: A Status Report,
14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 2-3 (1993).
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ployees and outside entities,19 the idea that shares of state
owned enterprises'96 will be publicly traded by private own-
ers on a stock exchange was not officially considered until
Beijing had given official sanction to the securities exchanges
in Shanghai in 1990 and Shenzhen in 1991.19"
195. Companies may be allowed by the government to issue shares without
being allowed to list those shares on the stock exchanges. Schell & Lappin, supra
note 7, at 727-28.
Until 1992, the transformation of Chinese state-owned enterprises into
shareholding enterprises was done on an ad hoc basis. On July 1, 1994, China's
new company law became effective and is considered a breakthrough in the
country's economic reforms. The new national law will play an extremely impor-
tant role in the transformation of China's state enterprises from state-owned enti-
ties into modern, shareholding corporate entities. It also presents new opportuni-
ties and challenges for foreign investors. See Preston Torbert, China's New Compa-
ny Law: Foreign Investment Issues, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Aug. 13, 1994, at 7.
China has had a number of separate forms of corporate enterprises: state-
owned enterprises, nonstate owned enterprises such as TVEs, private enterprises
and foreign-invested enterprises, each with its own legal regime. The regulations
on companies are but a first step towards a unified set of legislation on compa-
nies. The new company law will have primarily a gap-filling function, as far as
foreign investment is concerned, since it appears that it will only have an effect
on issues not covered by prior legislation. Id.
196. Not all shares of state-owned enterprises can be publicly traded. See infra
note 207 and accompanying text.
197. As is often the case with China, the center of regional initiatives has
leapt far ahead of the ability of the central authorities to legislate or regulate.
Even before Shanghai opened China's first national computerized stock exchange,
over-the-counter markets for equity and bond trading had occurred in Shanghai
and Shenyang as early as 1986. See Securities Exchange Opens in Shanghai,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1990, at 13. And the first public offering of shares oc-
curred as early as 1984, with the offering of shares in Shanghai Feile Audio.
Following Shanghai's lead, informal over-the-counter trading of enterprise
bonds and treasury bills began to proliferate without official authorization or su-
pervision as peddlers began hawking stocks and bonds to investors on street cor-
ners. See Henry R. Zheng, Business Organization and Securities Laws of the
People's Republic of China, 43 Bus. LAW. 551, 604-19 (1988). In an attempt to give
some order to the frenzy of trading, Beijing, in 1986, authorized Shenyang to open
a "stock market," which in reality was nothing more than a cashier's window in a
bank office and a blackboard listing the prices of a few fixed-interest government
bonds. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 728.
Shenzhen too experienced the frenzy of securities trading. Located across
the border from aggressively entrepreneurial Hong Kong, Shenzhen became a trad-
ing center for smaller, export-oriented enterprises while Shanghai became the
trading center for securities in larger state enterprises. In 1987, the first public
issue of equity securities took place in Shenzhen. See Andrew Quinn, China's
Southern Stock Market Butts Heads with Beijing, Reuter World Service, July 15,
1991, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXPRIM File. By 1992, when the
upstart regional economic zone decided to open its own stock exchange with or
without Beijing's official approval, there was little Beijing could do except meekly
work out a compromise in which Shenzhen agreed to defer its opening until after
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In an effort to exert some semblance of control over the
development and governance of the exchanges, both Shanghai
and Shenzhen have adopted a confusing maze of regulations to
cover a range of activities including regulations on share issu-
ance, broker-dealers, and stock exchange operations."' As
Shanghai's. Schell & Lapin, supra note 7, at 727.
Demand for the limited number of listed securities became so great in both
exchanges that officials in Shanghai and Shenzhen had to adopt a system of num-
bered tickets. The system allowed the ticket purchasers to enter a lottery in which
the winners alone were entitled to register with a broker for the purchase of list-
ed shares. See Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 732. In August of 1992 a riot
broke out at the Shenzhen stock market when a million hopeful investors stood in
line to buy five million lottery tickets only to discover that there would not be
enough tickets to go around. Andrew Browne, China Stocks Surge as Rescue Pack-
age Unveiled, REUTER ASIA-PAC. BUS. REP., Mar. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, REUAPB File.
Despite astronomical demands, the authorities have moved cautiously. When
Shenzhen first opened its exchange in 1991, only five companies with a book value
of 200 million renminbi were listed (although approximately 200 enterprises had
been transformed into shareholding companies ready for listing and although al-
most 520 million yuan worth of stocks had been issued). OVERHOLT, supra note 26,
at 168; China Curbs Shenzhen Bourse, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 13, 1991, at
7; Shenzhen Securities Exchange Opens, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Service, July
3, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA File. By 1992, only 17 com-
panies had succeeded in listing on Shenzhen. Similarly, Shanghai opened with
seven listed shares in 1991 and by the end of 1992, increased to twenty-six.
OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 169. These were but a tiny portion of the more than
3000 issues that Chinese enterprises were already selling internally to their em-
ployees and over-the-counter to other investors. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at
727.
198. See Shanghai Securities Transaction Regulations, Dec. 12, 1990, translated
and microformed on Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, China,
No. FBIS-CHI-90-245, at 46 (Dec. 20, 1990); see also Provisional Measures of
Shenzhen Municipality for Administration of the Issue and Trading of Shares,
June 15, 1991, translated and reproduced in E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Sept. 15,
1992, at 21, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, EASIAN File (hereinafter
Shenzhen Regulations). For a discussion of the Shenzhen regulations, see Pitman
Potter, The Legal Framework for Securities Market in China: The Challenge of
Monitoring State Control and Inducing Investor Confidence, 7 CHINA L. REP. 61,
74-76 (1992).
There is, in addition, an ancillary set of regulations consisting of notices
and interim measures. For regulations relating to Shanghai activities, see Detailed
Implementing Rules for the Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration
of Special Renminbi-Denominated Shares, Nov. 25, 1991, reproduced and translated
in CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, CHINAH File;
Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of Special Remnibi-Denomi-
nated Shares, Nov. 22, 1991, reproduced and translated in CHINA HAND, Oct. 1,
1992, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, CHINAH File (covering B shares).
For regulations relating to Shenzhen activities, see Rules for the Implementation
of the Interim Procedures for the Administration of Special Stocks in RMB (B-type
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yet, there is no national securities legislation. " However,
the Interim Regulations on the Issue and Trading of Shares
were passed on April 22, 1993 to alleviate some of the confu-
sion and fill in some of the gaps unaddressed by the Shanghai
or Shenzhen regulations. 0 The following analysis does not
serve to elucidate all of the regulations enumerated above, but
rather only those rules and regulations which are relevant to
an examination of Chinese privatization within the context of
state sector ownership reform.
Because China remains ideologically confined by market
socialism, privatization of state enterprises has involved only a
minority portion of state enterprise shares. The government
has been very careful to maintain majority ownership in those
state enterprises which it has chosen to privatize. Thus, capital
markets in China have not been permitted to develop or prolif-
erate in a way that will tip the balance of power away from the
state's dominant role in the economy. As a result, China's
shareholding system and its securities exchanges are designed
more to serve the state's financing needs and to reinforce the
state's position as majority shareholder than to create greater
transparency of privatized enterprises for the benefit of share-
holders. In this respect, privatization of the state sector has
not meant the creation of a class of independent capitalist
investors but instead, the subordination of private capital by
the state.
Chinese legislation classifies shares by their holders rather
Stocks) in Shenzhen City, Dec. 16, 1991, reproduced and translated in CHINA
ECON. NEWS, Feb. 3, 1992, at 7; Interim Procedures on Control of Shenzhen Spe-
cial (B-Type) RMB Stocks, Dec. 5, 1991, reproduced and translated in CHINA ECON.
NEWS, Jan. 27, 1992, at 7.
199. Legal drafters have been working on national securities legislation for
more than two years, and the document has been through more than ten drafts.
"Confusion has been compounded by an array of overlapping administrations over-
seeing the markets. These include China's central bank, the China Securities Reg-
ulatory Commission and the various stock market officials." Andrew Browne, Argu-
ments Hold Up China's Securities Law, Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Nov. 29, 1994,
available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE File.
200. The Interim Regulations supplement the Shanghai and Shenzhen regula-
tions and consist of eight chapters dealing with issuance and trading of shares
(Chapter 3: Trading of Shares); takeovers (Chapter 4: Takeover of Listed Compa-
nies); custody, clearance, and registration of shares (Chapter 5: Custody, Clearance
and Registration); information disclosure (Chapter 6: Disclosure Obligations of
Listed Companies); inspection and penalties (Chapter 7: Investigation and Penal-
ties); and dispute resolution (Chapter 8: Arbitration of Disputes).
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than their characteristics: state shares, legal person shares,
individual shares, (collectively, "A shares"), and foreign invest-
ment shares (domestically-listed but overseas-invested stocks,
known as "B shares").2 ' State shares. 2 are purchased with
state assets by governmental departments and usually consti-
tute 50% or more of all the shares issued.0 3 Because the gov-
ernment has reconciled itself to the separation of management
from ownership, the governmental department holding the
state shares does not become involved in the day-to-day man-
agement of the enterprise 4 Legal person shares are owned
by entities such as companies and institutions.0 5 Individual
201. See Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 198, art. 33.
"A" shares are held by domestic investors whereas "B" shares are held by
foreign investors. Until the beginning of 1992, shares on both the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges were denominated in the local currency, the renminbi,
and were open only to Chinese entities and individuals. In early 1992, both ex-
changes allowed foreigners to invest in Chinese enterprises through special issues
of B shares. While A shares are sold in renminbi to Chinese nationals only, B
shares, denominated in renminbi, are subscribed for and traded in foreign curren-
cy.
While both shares are subjected to the same obligations, dividends on B
shares must be paid in foreign exchange (U.S. dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong
dollars in Shenzhen). Dividends on A shares are paid in renminbi. At the present
time, there is no provision for the conversion of A shares to B shares or vice
versa, and the government has indicated that this will not be possible until the
yuan is fully convertible. It must be noted that although the new company law
adopted on July 1, 1994, does not specifically abolish the share distinction system,
it does not call for specific share legislation.
202. The question that China has wrestled with from the outset, as reflected in
an internal report to the National People's Congress Standing Committee, is the
following: 'state-owned enterprises are gradually changing to the shareholding
system and are listing one after another. Given the fact that 'state-owned shares'
are tokens of public ownership, should we legislate to protect them to prevent the
state from losing controlling power over those enterprises?" Article Views Debate on
Formulation of Securities Act, British Broadcasting Corp. Summary of World
Broadcasts, Mar. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, TBBCSW File.
203. Qian, supra note 91, at 87.
There had been some rumors that state officials might be willing to allow
state enterprises to be "quasi-privatized" once the enterprises change from state to
shareholding status. Quasi-privatization would mean that the state would make
radical concessions on the question of property rights and ownership. In that case,
state holdings in the new shareholding company could be as little as 20% or even
15%. See China to Cut State Holdings to 20%, Paper Says, Japan Econ. Newswire,
Dec. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, JEN File.
204. See, e.g., Christine Chan, Calls Growing to End China's Share Classes, S.
CHINA MORNING POsT, Dec. 3, 1993, (Business), at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, SCHINA File. Matthew Bersani, Stock Companies in China: An Alterna-
tive Format for Foreign Investment?, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., July 15, 1993, at
9.
205. Legal persons shares are frequently held by local governmental organiza-
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shares are owned by either the employees of the company or by
third parties in the general public. The classification of shares
based on the identity of the shareholder has allowed the gov-
ernment to ensure that its dominance will not be threatened
by other holders of stock. As a result, the securities market has
resulted in majority ownership by the state and a maximum of
35% ownership by foreigners."'
To further ensure state majority ownership remains intact,
only individual shares of listed companies can be traded on the
exchanges." 7 Clearly, the illiquidity of state owned shares
"makes it difficult for stock markets to exercise their function
of adjusting state owned assets structurally.""' This problem
tions or subsidiaries of state enterprises. Roberta S. Karmel, Tossing Capitalism in
Shanghai, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 1993, at 4.
206. By contrast, the Polish plan for privatization, having made a decisive
break from the vestiges of socialism, consists of a shareholding system in which
the state is expected to retain but a minority interest. Each of the 500 largest
state enterprises scheduled for privatization, for example, will be converted into a
shareholding format; 10% of the shares will be given free of charge to the work-
ers, 30% retained by the state, and the remaining 60% transferred to new owners
through privatization vouchers. FRYDMIAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 14, at 63.
Under this model, free vouchers received by the populace will be used to "pur-
chase" shares in a number of intermediary institutions such as investment and
restructuring funds. Once the vouchers are transferred to the intermediaries, the
companies will then be sold at an auction. The intermediaries which win the bid
become legal owners of the shares of the privatized enterprises. The individuals, in
turn, hold the shares of the intermediaries. Id. at 30. The state's shares will be
deposited with the intermediaries who will be charged with selling those shares,
either by private placement or in the open market. Id. at 64.
207. Andrew Browne, China Announces Stock Market Rescue, Prices Surge,
Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Mar. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library,
REUAPB File; see also Ren Kan, Domestic Investors to Get Share of Huge Stock
Issue, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE
File. An additional means for ensuring that the state retains its dominance is a
restriction on the number of shares individual shareholders are allowed to pur-
chase. Under the Shanghai rules, one single individual shareholder cannot pur-
chase shares equaling more than .5% of the total shares issued. Qian, supra note
91, at 87 n.102.
208. Foo Choy Peng, 5.5b Shares Planned for Mainlanders, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 20, 1994, (Business), at 4, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library,
SCHINA File. As the above quote by Liu Hongru, chairperson of the China Securi-
ties Regulatory Commission, reveals, Chinese officials do in fact realize that public
listings would "enhance the transparency of the market by ensuring the full dis-
closure of information." Id. However, the "problem must be gradually solved be-
cause it has a bearing on the property rights system of state-owned assets and
the business administration system." Id.
A proposal has been put forth that would allow state-owned shares to be
traded yet at the same time protect the state's interest in retaining control. Under
this plan, state-held shares can be traded, but the state retains the right to re-
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can easily be solved by allowing state owned shares to be trad-
ed. However, despite repeated suggestions that shares owned
by the state and by legal persons be merged with shares owned
by individuals,"9 and presumably publicly traded, the gov-
ernment has steadfastly held to the original design, except in
one rare instance.210 Hence, although the majority of A
deem the shares within five years. "T]he proposal would enable state-held shares
to effectively realise their value, improve a company's shareholding structure and
avoid loss of state-owned property." Chan, supra note 204, at 1. Should the state
elect not to exercise its right to redeem the shares within the allotted time period,
it would do so because it believes a better return could be achieved on other in-
vestments. Id.
209. Browne, supra note 207. Legal persons are among those most eager for
the merging of shares. Originally promised at the time of purchase that their
shares would be eventually listed, they have been anxious to cash in on their
stock investments. Id.
China has been studying the possibility of listing corporate-owned shares.
Although only individual shares are publicly traded on the securities exchanges, a
small number of corporate-owned shares have been listed on the Securities Trad-
ing Automated Quotations System (STAQ) and National Electric Trading System
(NETS). Kan, supra note 207. Because speculation about the possible listing of
state-owned shares and corporate shares have continued to fuel investors' worries
that such listings may result in another dive in share prices, the government
publicly announced in January of 1994 that such listings will not occur in the
near future. Liu Weiling, China: Wariness Reigns Among Stock Investors, BUS. WK.
(China Daily Supp.), Jan. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE
File.
Calls to allow the free transfer of state shares and to abolish the distinction
between the different classes of shares have not been directed only at the current
distinctions within the A shares market. There have been suggestions calling for
the merger of A and B shares as well, which would require a freely convertible
yuan. Until the yuan can be made freely convertible, however, it has been sug-
gested that Chinese investors holding foreign currency should be allowed to buy B
shares and vice versa. Chan, supra note 204, at 1.
One reason for allowing domestic investors to buy B shares would be to add
some fire to the cool B shares market. Some discrepancy in valuation has arisen
between the two shares, so that while A shares of a company trade at a certain
point, B shares of the same company trade at a much lower value. Chinese inves-
tors with an excess of yuan are eager to invest in almost any financial instru-
ment-thus demand far outstrips supply. By contrast, foreign investors graced with
a wide range of investment options are less likely to put up with the inadequate
regulations governing the Chinese market. Inefficient Markets?, ECONOMIST, July
31, 1993, at 70.
While China's legal scholars and economists debate the point, classifications
based on the identities of shareholders remain.
210. When Shanghai Dazhong Taxi announced a novel scheme to convert some
of its legal person shares into B shares for foreign investors, the plan was at first
rejected by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Browne, supra note 207.
The state's initial rejection reflects the state's fear that foreign firms would gain
too much control of an enterprise. Conversion of legal person shares into B shares
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shares in most listed companies are state owned, they are not
traded.2 ' Legal person shares held by institutions can only
be traded on a separate, electronic network.212 Individual
shares can be traded, but they constitute only a fraction of
shares issued by a listed company.213 Clearly, ensuring state
dominance is much more important to the government than
ensuring the efficient and transparent workings of a capital
market.
Aside from the separation of shares by reference to their
owners, China has been tenacious in protecting the state's
interest in other respects as well.1 4 When reformers consid-
would increase the supply of B shares by 37-40% on both the Shanghai and
Shenzhen exchanges-hence the fear expressed by a spokesperson for the China
Securities Regulatory Committee that "opening A shares to foreigners amounted to
a sell-out of state property rights . . . . " Ivan Tong, Dazhong's B-share Plan Ve-
toed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
SCHINA File.
However, in the end, Dazhong Taxi did win approval to test the controver-
sial conversion of legal person shares into B shares, a move which will give for-
eigners a majority stake in the company. Id. The Shanghai Securities Administra-
tion has noted that foreigners must still comply with existing regulations and that
although the merging of all shares is inevitable, there is a long way to go because
many important details still need to be worked out, the most important of which
is a freely convertible yuan. Zheng Jie, China: Swap of Corporate Shares into B is
Only Experiment, Reuter, SHANGHAI STAR, July 5, 1994, available in LEXIS,
WORLD Library, TXTLNE File.
It should also be noted that Dazhong Taxi won the right to convert legal
person shares into B shares only because as a taxi operating company, it was not
considered a key industry. Id.
211. One reason for state majority ownership and nontransferability of state
shares is to prevent buyout by foreign firms. Chan, supra note 204, at 1.
212. Kan, supra note 207.
213. Another trade-off that results from the illiquidity of state shares is the
small number of shares that are actually traded, potentially resulting in a market
more susceptible to manipulation. See Andrew Browne, Currency Fears May Stall
Chinese Share Reform, Reuters World Service, Jan. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, REUWLD File.
214. Beijing issued a circular requiring publicly listed companies to safeguard
the interests of the state when issuing new shares. According to the circular, state
shareholders, usually an administrative organ or a government department, were
being discriminated against by companies which asked the state shareholders to
relinquish their right to buy new shares. While other shareholders were entitled to
bonus issues, state-owned shares were only awarded cash bonuses, resulting in a
dilution of state shares and state control. State Defends Rights as Shareholder, S.
CHINA MORNING POsT, April 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA
File.
State shareholders were also admonished that "[wlhen there is a decision
for a bonus issue or placement during a shareholders' meeting, government rep-
resentatives who hold shares must safeguard state interest-they cannot blindly
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ered other experimental measures inimical to the principle of
majority state ownership, the government did not hesitate to
exercise its central authority to ensure the primacy and sancti-
ty of state shares. When Shenzhen issued a regulation allow-
ing state enterprises to trade their 1994 bonus shares six
months after issue, the central government quickly moved to
quash the brazenly renegade move. As Zhu Li, spokesperson
for the Securities Regulatory Committee said, "trading in
shares other than those held by individuals is banned because
it involves aspects of transfer of national property rights."15
Not only has the state maintained control over state enter-
prises listed on the stock exchange, it has also carved out a
role for itself as architect of the stock exchange. Thus, under
current Chinese practice, it is the state which controls the
number and type of enterprises that will become shareholding
companies, and which among those shareholding companies
will be allowed to be listed.216 It is no surprise that under the
present rules, each Chinese province is allocated a strict annu-
al quota of shares for listing in Shanghai or Shenzhen.217
Despite strict state control, China's securities market has
performed its designated fundraising functions218 by absorb-
agree with the decision.'" Id. (quoting circular issued by the State Assets Adminis-
trative Bureau of Beijing).
215. Beijing Slaps Southern Bourse on Rogue Reform, Reuter Eur. Bus. Rep.,
Mar. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, REUEUB File. "Allowing
state-held bonus shares to trade on the open market would inevitably erode the
state's holdings and eventually could undermine its majority ownership[.1" Id.
216. Kan, supra note 207. The state selects which domestic firms are allowed
to list A shares on the domestic as well as which domestic firms are allowed to
list on overseas exchanges. Id.; see also Peng, supra note 208, at 4.
The state also sets the total number of shares that can be issued to domes-
tic investors. According to Ma Zhongzhi of the State Council Securities Policy
Committee, "'ftihe figure [is] set after fully considering the stock market's capaci-
ty.'" Kan, supra note 207.
217. Browne, supra note 207.
218. For example, when Shanghai Vacuum Electron Device Co. issued one mil-
lion B shares on the market in December 1991, the shares were sold within one
day. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 739. The supply for B shares could barely
meet the demand. Shenbao Industrial Corporation's issuance of $1.34 million worth
of B shares on the Shenzhen Securities Exchange in June 1992 was immediately
over-subscribed. Overseas investors flooded the market with $112 million in sub-
scription funds, or about 80 times the par value of available securities. Id.
When the securities market was opened to foreign investment at the end of
1991, foreign investors reacted enthusiastically by launching over 20 China funds
by the first half of 1992, raising more than $1 billion for investment in listed
securities as well as securities in unlisted companies. Julia Sze, The Allure of B
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ing capital into enterprises steadfastly controlled by the state.
Regardless of whether the'purpose of the securities system is
to raise capital for the state, to control renegade private capi-
tal, or to convert inert mattress money into investment re-
sources, the system has accomplished its objective with distinc-
tion.
Established for the purpose of pursuing very specific eco-
nomic goals, the securities system has been driven by a set of
economic imperatives forced upon the state by a bloated and
constantly cash-starved state sector." The issuance of A
shares has allowed the state to privatize by offering shares to
domestic investors while the issuance of B shares has attracted
much needed foreign exchange from foreign shareholders.
When the B share market did not attract as much foreign
exchange as originally contemplated, China swiftly acted to
increase its access to foreign money by listing Chinese state
enterprises on the stock exchanges of Hong Kong2 ° and New
York.22" ' Thus, it is interesting to note that the government's
Shares, CHINA BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 42, 42.
It has been estimated that there is $1.6 billion in stock market capitaliza-
tion for Chinese equities. The Rise of the Red Chip, EUROMONEY: INTERNATIONAL
INVESTORS' GuIDE TO ASIAN ISSUERS & CAPITAL MARKETS, Dec. 1993, at 23, 23
(Supp.).
219. Of course, fundraising by attracting domestic and foreign capital will also
mean by necessity increasing productivity and boosting profits. Particularly, at-
tracting foreign capital will have to mean a revamping of the current system to a
more transparent one more capable of producing solid financial data that meets
international standards of disclosure, all of which would, theoretically, result in
more shareholder protection.
220. In an effort to expand fundraising potentials, in October 1992, China re-
leased a list of nine companies chosen as the first mainland-based companies to
seek direct listing in Hong Kong. Sze, supra note 218, at 48. In 1993, China ear-
marked another 22 companies for international listing.
Maanshan Iron & Steel Company was one of the nine chosen to issue what
has become known as "H" shares in Hong Kong. Instead of accessing foreign capi-
tal either through government loans or joint ventures with foreign investors, the
company was allowed to list in an overseas market. In one of the largest public
listing for a Chinese company in Hong Kong, the company raised $505 million.
The Rise of The Red Chip, supra note 218, at 23.
221. In October 1992, China Brilliance Automotive became the first Chinese
company (though registered in Bermuda) to list on the New York Stock Exchange.
By year's end, its stock price climbed 80%. Sze, supra note 218, at 48.
The first company registered in China to be traded on the New York Stock
Exchange was Shanghai Petrochemical, the largest petrochemical enterprise in Chi-
na, which processes crude oil into a broad range of synthetic fibers and plastics.
See Michael Hirsh, Anatomy of a Privatization, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Int'l Ed.),
Apr. 1994, at 86.
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solution to foreign reluctance to purchase B shares is not nec-
essarily to improve the B share market or the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Rather, the government's solution
is simply to find another way to access foreign capital. This is
in stark contrast to the fact that no foreign company has been
allowed to tap into China's domestic capital and list on China's
exchanges.222
State dominance of the securities market has resulted in a
number of severe distortions. The financing functions of the
securities market which are designed to serve solely the state's
financial needs have been overemphasized at the expense of
other objectives. For example, the need to establish a compe-
tent and well-regulated system of corporate governance, the
implementation of an effective ownership structure, and man-
agement accountability are all areas which have been ignored
while the state continued its fundraising campaign. 3 In this
Chinese companies, such as China Tire and Rubber, China Erfangji and
Shanghi Chlor-Alkali, and other companies who are B share issuers in the China
market, are presently looking for avenues besides the issuance of B shares to tap
the U.S. market. For example, these companies conduct offerings to qualified insti-
tutional buyers in the form of American Depository Receipts using the 144a ex-
emption to the U.S. federal securities laws. The Rise of the Red Chip, supra note
218, at 24.
222. Reports of planned listings by blue chip firms such as Germany's Daimler-
Benz and Hong Kong's Bank of East Asia have piqued mainland investors' inter-
ests. After years of negotiations, Daimler-Benz finally confirmed its plans to be-
come the first foreign company to list on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. As a
general rule, however, China, does not currently allow the listing of foreign firms
on the mainland, nor will the much-awaited national Securities Law cover such
listings. Christine Chan, Mainland Stock Markets Fear an Exodus of Funds, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 1, 1994, (Business), at 7, available in LEXIS, News
Library, SCHINA File. Zhang Ning, vice director of the Shanghai Securities Ad-
ministration Office, said there were mixed feelings about allowing foreign compa-
nies to list in Shanghai: "We don't have much investment capital in China. If
companies are looking to raise cash, it would make much more sense for them to
do it in the West." Browne, supra note 213.
223. Reports of "unorthodox" practices (to put it euphemistically) on the state's
part, have been rampant. For example, according to officials of the Shanghai Vacu-
um Electron Device Co., although the Shanghai municipal government owns 75%
of its stock, it has never paid for the shares. Nonetheless, it has received divi-
dends on them! Schroeder, supra note 178, at 21.
Numerous complaints about company compliance with standard and basic
regulations have also been received by the China Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion. Commission chairperson, Liu Hongru, acknowledged that "'[clomplaints have
been received on companies failing to make improvements on their operations as
promised in their listing prospectuses.'" Christine Chan, Quality of Listed Stocks
Must be Raised, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS,
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respect, state sector privatization has been a disappointment,
primarily because it has been constrained by the ideological
dictate of state majority ownership and motivated by the over-
riding belief that private shareholders exist to serve the state's
needs.
4. Future Privatization in China
While "better" privatization is obviously called for, should
the government opt for more privatization? The answer to this
question depends on the following fundamental factors: (1)
what will more privatization achieve, or what does the govern-
ment hope to achieve with more privatization; (2) whether the
purpose can be accomplished by means other than more privat-
ization; and (3) what the costs of more privatization may be
and whether they are palatable to the Chinese government.
At the present time, China has flatly ruled out any large-
scale privatization of the kind that exists in Eastern European
countries. 4 More privatization has been suggested because it
is believed that it is the only solution to the problem of soft
budget constraints. Yet if feasible alternatives to privatization,
such as increased marketization, competition, and innovation,
can harden the budget, then perhaps more privatization is not
necessarily the first and only solution to severing the vicious
cycle of enterprise loss and government subsidies.
In this regard, there are some positive signs that Chinese
state enterprises have responded competitively to the injection
of market forces into the economy. Additionally, Chinese prov-
inces have become progressively less willing to expend precious
News Library, SCHINA File. "To most of the companies, issuing and listing
shares is solely with the aim of raising cash, Improvements in the management
structure and obligations of shareholders are always thrown behind." Id.
Other shareholder complaints include ignoring original plans for share issue
proceeds, failing to keep shareholders informed of company developments, id., and
paying shareholders very small dividends despite highly priced rights issues.
Weiling, supra note 209.
224. As early as 1991, the Communist Party announced that it would oppose
such sweeping economic restructuring. See George White, Chinese Economic Re-
form: Is It Enough?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at D3.
The state has been more willing to sell small and medium-sized enterprises.
In 1993, about 10,000 were sold, transferred, or merged, according to the State
Commission for Economic Restructuring. China: Struggling Firms Sold to Increase
Efficiency, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library,
TXPRIM File.
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funds to subsidize bankrupt state firms. The growth of mar-
kets and the mounting pressures posed by competition have
meant that government intervention through subsidies is no
longer automatic. For example, Chinese provinces must now
compete with one another for access to domestic and foreign
capital."' Since expenditures for subsidies mean that less
money will be available to finance profitable and investment-
friendly ventures such as airports, telecommunications, and
other necessary infrastructure projects, subsidies as a solution
to inefficiency have progressively less appeal. The message to
state enterprises is, of course, to look to the market and not
the government for financial salvation.
Furthermore, if limited state sector privatization can gen-
erate sufficient capital to make up for the losses sustained by
money-losing enterprises, then perhaps more privatization is
not required. This, of course is a big "if."
Even if more privatization is economically mandatory, the
social ramifications attached to such an endeavor could be so
great that the government may be unwilling to tolerate them.
After all, state companies still employ more than 100 million
workers and function like "virtual mini-welfare states" 226 pro-
viding cradle-to-grave social services for workers and their
families. Even if privatization is done in the name of compas-
sionate destruction, legitimate fears exist that it will inevitably
lead to a showdown between cost cutting on the one hand and
225. Rawski, supra note 148, at 40.
226. Hirsh, supra note 221, at 86. Yizheng Chemical Fiber Co., for example,
earmarked for privatization, that is, for a private placement of a 29.4% stake of
the company in Europe, the United States and Japan, has performed many of the
traditional social welfare tasks for its workers, such as running schools, a day care
center, a park, and a hospital. Id.; see also Privatizing China's State Sector: Anoth-
er Long March?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1993, at 74.
Only the best companies can be earmarked for listing. "Best" is equated
with biggest, according to Rolf Gerber, president of the Hong Kong based invest-
ment bank SBCI Finance Asia. The biggest companies in China will also be com-
panies that are '"half cities, with hospitals, fire departments and schools,'" or com-
panies that also perform "auxiliary services" such as employing surplus labor, not
just the "productive core" that foreign investors want to privatize. Id. at 75.
The Chinese government and international investors have sought to control
the problem of "corporate mini-welfare states" by restructuring the enterprise to be
listed and splitting the business function of the enterprise from its social services
sector. Thus, the investor is buying a new, restructured company, which contains
only the actual business operations. The social sector of the old corporation is also
restructured into a new entity, which is still wholly owned by the state.
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full employment on the other."7 Thus, more privatization, or,
at least, more responsible privatization, may be a viable option
only after the construction and institution of a social safety
net.228
State sector privatization has presented especially difficult
questions for China's interior provinces which attract much
less foreign investment than its more prosperous coastal ar-
eas.229 The reluctance to subject the state sector to market
discipline has meant that of the more than one-hundred thou-
sand state companies in China, 23 ' 45% of which are losing
money,231 fewer than five-hundred firms have been allowed to
227. As noted, Beijing is "showing an unapparent unwillingness to suffer
capitalism's downside: unemployment." Privatizing China's State Sector: Another
Long March?, supra note 226, at 74. Bruce Murray, the Asian Development Bank's
program manager for China, stated that "'[dlealing with redundant labor is a ma-
jor problem. The Chinese are taking a step-by-step approach, as opposed to the
"big bang" seen in Eastern Europe and Russia.'" Id. at 75.
Currently, however, as the government is beginning to implement reform
measures which include allowing state enterprises to become bankrupt, workers
have staged sit-ins and other protests, testing the government's resolve to balance
reform with social stability. Mark O'Neill, China Workers Protest at Bankruptcy,
Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Oct. 28, 1994, at 8, 8, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library, REUAPB File.
228. As Wang Shiyuan, Secretary General of China's State Commission for
Restructuring the Economic Systems reported in a government publication, "'Only
when the social security system is established and perfected can enterprise reform
be further deepened and a system realized in which efficient enterprises prosper
and inefficient ones fail.'" Blustein, supra note 27, at A27.
When Chongqing, a city located in the interiors of Sichuan Province, laid off
2,000 workers from the largest state-owned knitting mill as part of a restructuring
and reorganization effort to bring the factory out of insolvency, the workers
marched on city hall and threatened to riot. The city responded by hiring 800 of
the jobless workers as street sweepers. Patrick Tyler, Overhaul of China's State
Industry at a Standstill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1994, at A12.
229. For example, Sichuan Province which is located in China's inland, attract-
ed $850 million in pledged foreign investment in 1993. By contrast, Guangdong
Province, which is located along the coast adjacent to Hong Kong, attracted $9.65
billion. Tyler, supra note 228, at A12. Yet, when Sichuan Province sought to di-
vest itself of the financial burdens linked to its money-losing state enterprises by
proposing to privatize thirty-three state firms, the plan was not approved by
Beijing, which feared worker unrest and political instability. Id.
230. Depending on the source and the manner of classification, the number of
state companies has fluctuated. It has been estimated that China still has more
than 400,000 state-owned enterprises employing 80 million workers. The largest of
the state enterprises, 11,000 of them, cost the state approximately $26 billion a
year in subsidies, more than China spends on public health and education.
Blustein, supra note 27, at A27. It has been estimated that state subsidies consti-
tute approximately 14% of the government's revenue. A Survey of China: When
China Wakes, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 63, 10.
231. Official statistics may actually understate the problem. While it has gener-
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go bankrupt,232 although a bankruptcy law was passed as
early as 1989.233 Also, only four-thousand state companies
have become shareholding enterprises as of the end of 1993,
and only 200 have been allowed to list on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen exchanges." 4
However, the government has earmarked state sector
reform as the number one priority for 1995. It has vowed to
use the bankruptcy law as well as other devices to prod slug-
gish enterprises into either profitability or extinction. 35
Clearly, the government is trying to deal with the problem that
haunts Eastern Europe and Russia today, namely what to do
with state enterprises that were once national treasures but
ally been acknowledged that approximately one-third of China's state enterprises
are chronically losing money, the actual number of losses, disguised by accounting
methods, may be twice that amount. A Survey of China: When China Wakes, su-
pra note 230, at 9-10.
232. Bankruptcy would unleash a forceful and tsunamic domino effect. Most
enterprises are entangled in a web of interfirm debt, one enterprise owing money
to another enterprise resulting in complicated linkages of debt among firms. In
addition to interfirm debt within the state sector, the state sector itself is inextri-
cably linked to a primitive and inefficient banking system. In order to keep loans
viable, at least on the book, state banks have to keep lending to money-losing
state enterprises at low interest, with little prospect of being repaid, so that the
banks themselves can appear to be operating in the black.
Privatizing the state sector would require not only reforming the financial
sector but the social service functions currently provided by the large state enter-
prises as well. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union face a similar set of
insoluble contradictions. Stabilizing the price level is incompatible with
keeping the 'white elephants' alive with unrepayable credits. But closing
them could inflame the already smoldering popular discontent, since the
state enterprises not only employ a large share of the work force, but
also supply much of the social services through job-connected housing,
schools, clinics and recreational facilities.
David Felix, Smith and Machiavelli Go to Moscow: Further Observations on Radi-
cal Reform, 37 CHALLENGE 48, 50 (1994).
The difference between the former Eastern bloc and China, of course, is
that a robust nonstate sector is in place in China to alleviate at least some of the
shock that state sector restructuring would unleash. China also has established a
successful regime of export trade on the one hand and foreign investment on the
other, both of which may provide additional sources of employment.
233. Hirsh, supra note 221, at 86. A bankruptcy law was adopted by the Sixth
National People's Congress on December 2, 1986. See Henry R. Zheng, Bankruptcy
Law of the People's Republic of China: Principle, Procedure & Practice, 19 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 683 (1986).
234. Hirsh, supra note 221, at 86.
235. Jeffrey Parker, China Told Not to Fear Foreign Stake in State Sector,
Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Nov. 18, 1994, available in, LEXIS, ASIAPC Library,
REUAPB File.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
that are now economic liabilities, without causing a collapse of
other institutions. By privatizing its state enterprises slowly
and cautiously and allowing private interests only a minority
equity ownership, China apparently hopes to retain control
over the growth and direction of state enterprises as well as
the speed and conditions under which they are privatized.
Like other transitional economies, China finds itself in a
catch-22 situation. State sector privatization could be
destabilizing but the cost of avoiding it may be even greater.
For example, private sector income growth, which enters the
state's banking system as savings, is being converted into low-
interest loans by the state to subsidize state sector losses.236
Currently, almost 80% of all bank loans are being fed into the
state sector.237
For the reasons suggested above, China could improve
privatization, both from a fundraising and a market efficiency
perspective by implementing a few simple changes in the cur-
rent securities system. These changes could include allowing
more enterprises already converted to shareholding companies
to list, permitting private and institutional investors to pur-
chase a greater percentage of shares issued, and increasing the
number of shares publicly tradeable on the stock exchanges. If
and when the government decides to privatize the bulk of its
state enterprises in order to slow the demand for bailouts and
subsidies, the institutional framework of the nonstate sector
and the market-supportive institutions already established
should minimize the shock of privatization as well as maximize
the benefits. Market forces already in place and the existing
market-responsive environment will no doubt amplify the ben-
efits that privatization itself is supposed to provide.
V. CONCLUSION
The Chinese model of privatization was designed to avoid
the institutional vacuum associated with shock therapy reform.
As Senator Diane Feinstein has remarked in reference to the
Russian privatization model, "I have a basic concern about
whether it's practical and even possible to assume that a coun-
try can go from a tightly-centralized economy with low produc-
236. Tyler, supra note 228, at A12.
237. Id.
174 [Vol. MI: I
THE CHINESE MODEL
tion standards to a rapid and total release of centralized con-
trol and still maintain its standard of living." 8
Perhaps because China shared the same doubts, it has
decided to privatize in phases and avoid the rapid and imme-
diate privatization of the state sector that has defined the
Eastern European model. As such, the Chinese model of pri-
vatization means, first fostering the growth of a nascent,
nonstate sector which consists of a combination of private,
quasi-private, collective, and foreign-invested enterprises. The
engine for entrepreneurial innovation and growth is not sup-
posed to come from a collapse of the older order, but from the
creation of a sector of newly-formed companies, aided by the
removal of governmental barriers as well as the interfirm pro-
duction chains synergistically provided by the existing state
sector. China, in other words, has taken advantage of existing
institutional resources founded in the state sector to construct
a nonstate sector which has been largely responsible for a
spectacular economic growth averaging 8.8% since 1979.
Skepticism regarding the benefits of wholesale privatiza-
tion and reluctance to absorb large transition costs have led
China to explore alternatives to state sector privatization. The
introduction of market forces, the reassignment of property
rights, the institution of enterprise reform, and the emphasis
on managerial incentives and accountability have made state
enterprises operate more competitively and efficiently. The
interaction of state and private domains has created a
transformative process in which institutions themselves have
been reshaped and their behavior strategically reoriented in
response to an entirely new set of market-oriented rules. Thus,
although the goal has not been to reproduce capitalism or
Western markets, the reconfiguration process has contributed
to the formation of a functioning market which state sector
privatization alone is supposed to provide.
China is currently in its third phase of reform-state sec-
tor privatization. Ownership reform meant restructuring state
enterprises into a shareholding system, first t9 allow the state
to absorb and control what it deemed an excess pool of private
238. Foreign Operation, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropria-
tions: Hearings on H.R. 4426 Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, S. HRG.
No. 760, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1994).
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capital; second, to convert idle domestic savings into invest-
ment capital; and finally to alleviate the burdens exerted on
the state budget. Additionally, equity investment by private
shareholders is also seen as a way to make state enterprises
more efficient and profitable, and most importantly, more self-
sufficient. A functioning securities market and stock exchange
is seen as a way of forcing state enterprises to become more
transparent, by developing clearly articulated business goals,
regularly audited financial reports, a more direct sense of man-
agerial accountability, and other informational disclosure re-
quirements necessary to attract investment from the securi-
ties-holding public.
Although the current Chinese securities framework is
skewed in favor of state majority interests at the expense indi-
vidual shareholders, the Chinese model of privatization has
succeeded in bypassing the Russian and Eastern European
problem of "how to sell property that belongs to nobody and
has no value, to people who have no money."239 Nonetheless,
it may be unwise at this time to conclude that either system of
reform is better. China has gone about the business of creating
economic growth while suppressing debate on any political
alternatives that may undermine Party rule. Conversely, the
former Eastern bloc has focused on the "political and economic
consequences of various blueprints for a final economic transi-
tion-in some cases while their economies collapse around
them."24 The purpose of this Article is not to issue a pre-
scriptive conclusion that economic development should take
precedence over political liberalization or vice versa. Rather, it
is to call into question the current fetishistic role state sector
privatization has played in reforming centrally planned econo-
mies and to expand the terms of debate by offering alterna-
tives to the dominant Eastern European paradigm.
In this respect, the Chinese model challenges a number of
orthodox but unarticulated assumptions. The discourse on
transitional economies has occurred within a narrow frame-
work which assumes that the failure of centralized socialism
and the seeming economic superiority of capitalism means that
239. Jan Prybyla, The Interplay of Economics and Politics: The Transformation
of Social Systems, VITAL SPEECHES, July 15, 1993, at 60, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ASIAPII File.
240. Walder, supra note 93, at 64.
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the eventual destination for all economies must be Western-
style capitalism. According to this orthodox view, even though
transitional economies may exhibit differences, they are merely
differences in strategy and degree, speed and timing. Ultimate-
ly, the common end point is presumed to be the reproduction of
some versions of a U.S. or Western-style economy. China's
model of privatization presents a contrast to the assumption
that all transitional economies are destined toward the same
goal.
Additionally, it has been assumed that such an economy
can best be implemented by state sector privatization. Al-
though divesting the state of its assets and transferring them
into private hands may create a temporary institutional vacu-
um, the act of privatization itself, it is believed, will put in
place mechanisms that make up an efficient market economy.
Under this theory, privatization is an absolute imperative,
even in the absence of an already established market frame-
work. Privatization is considered a prerequisite for market-
oriented reform because it is believed that only privatization
can correct the inefficiencies of centrally planned economies.
Anything less than a complete rupture of state ownership will
result in a mutilated and half-transformed economy.
The Chinese model has proved the above assumptions to
be false. Systemic transformation can occur even in the ab-
sence of wholesale state sector privatization. Even within the
state sector, property rights such as the right to above-quota
income among various economic actors can be significantly
altered, from the state downward to the enterprise and then to
the individual with beneficial consequences. Moreover, con-
trary to the dominant model of privatization which has widely
assumed that state property rights must be divested, sustained
growth has been achieved by TVEs founded on a socially-based
system of ownership with direct ties to active local govern-
ments.
The success of TVEs has in turn called into question neo-
classical dogma about the dichotomy between public and pri-
vate ownership. While China may be an increasingly
marketized economy, it is not a predominantly private econo-
my. While reliance on the market has reduced the role of cen-
tral planning and increased output and growth, reliance on the
state, particularly local governments, has contributed to this
1995]
economic efficacy as well.24' Just as there are numerous ec -
nomic models in the West, there is no reason to believe that
the same diversity of possibilities cannot exist in transitional
economies.
In sum, what the Chinese experience has demonstrated is
that the creation of an emerging nonstate sector with new
economic entities is a viable alternative to the immediate and
mass privatization of the state sector. The Chinese experience
has also proved that competitive organization and economic
growth can be spawned by an unorthodox public-private model
of privatization. Moreover, competitive economic organizations
do not have to be either private or public but a combination of
the two, and may exhibit peculiarities in form and behavior
which may not fit neatly into any blueprint or design. Thus, if
growth can be generated by nonprivatized entities with poorly
defined property rights, privatization for the purpose of creat-
ing clear and well-defined property rights may not be a prereq-
uisite for all transitional economies. China has challenged the
assumption that there is but one route to economic productivi-
ty for transitional economies. If the end can be achieved by
means other than state sector privatization, and if the great
social costs associated therewith can be avoided, then the Chi-
nese model has in fact proved that wholesale privatization of
state enterprises is not the economic imperative it has been
made out to be.
241. In this respect, the Chinese experience is in some ways not that radically
different from the Western experience, which also exhibits a variety of ownership
rights and arrangements. Thus, it is interesting to note that the conventional pre-
scription issued by the shock therapists-unbridled, indivisible and private owner-
ship rights-does not even reflect the reality of Western experience.
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